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This thesis aims to test the concerns about the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
between the EU and six southern African countries, based on a policy simulation with 
the GTAP-Model. As with other EPAs, opponents worried about the state budgets, the 
current accounts, the regional trade, the agricultural sector and the industry. Other than 
in other model based studies of the EPAs, which concentrate on general welfare effects, 
this thesis aims to give detailed answers to the named concerns: 
 The state revenue decreases. An increase in sales taxes can balance the state 
budget, if deteriorations for some sectors are accepted 
 The current account does not suffer strongly from the agreement, but the trade 
balance to the EU is strongly impaired, and so are the terms of trade of the African 
partners.  
 The regional trade decreases, but this is offset by increasing trade with the EU and 
increasing exports to other countries. 
 Agriculture and industry are not strongly affected in their value added, but 
concentrate stronger on exports, which probably challenges smallholders and 
possibly small manufacturers. Additionally, wages, employment and land rents are 
discussed. 
 Even if the changes are often moderate, different effects accumulating in certain 
countries (like Mozambique) might present policy makers with difficult problems. 
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1.1 Motivation and context of the study 
Two Yaoundé Conventions and four Lomé Conventions had regulated the 
trade between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States (ACP) since the early 1960s. These systems gave 
unilateral preferences towards the ACP countries, but disappointed in their 
results: “the share of the ACP trade in the EU market was continuously falling 
and most countries did not manage to use these preferences to diversity their 
economic structures” (Ramdoo 2014, p. 1). Moreover, these preferences were 
not compatible with the rules of the WTO, as they “discriminated against non-
ACP developing countries” (ibid., p. 1). The Cotonou Agreement, concluded in 
2000, is supposed to redefine the relationship by replacing the non-reciprocal 
trade-preferences with Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) (Kone 
2008). 
The SADC EPA
1
, a comprehensive agreement EPA with Botswana, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa, was 
successfully concluded in 2014 and signed in 2016 (the initially included 
Angola did not conclude the EPA, Mozambique ratified in April 2017) 
(European Commission 2017). But it is strongly disputed, if this agreement is 
not only “in conformity with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
                                                        
1
 The SADC it the Southern African Development Community. The name “SADC EPA” is 
ambiguous, as only a fraction of the SADC members is in this EPA, others are in the EPA of the 
Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA). Indeed, the splitting of the SADC members into the SADC 
EPA and the ESA EPA was a compromise: All countries of the southern and eastern African 
regions (except for Mozambique) belong to two or more regional integration schemes. As both 
SADC and COMESA intend to establish custom unions, creating a conflict of interest that was 
solved with the splitting of both regions (Meyn 2008) 
1 Introduction 
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(‘GATT 1994’), and in particular Article XXIV thereof.” (L250, Article 20), 
but also meet the expectations of an improved trade situation and a diversified 
economy in the Regional Groups. Hence, this thesis seeks to translate the 
agreement text into the theoretical framework of a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model and give a careful assessment on its effects. More 
precisely, the CGE used here is the Global Trade Analysis Project, GTAP, with 
the GTAP 9 Data Base
2
. 
1.2 Literature review 
Within the last ten years, impacts of the SADC EPA were estimated several 
times – however, these analyses all refer to previous versions of the EPA or 
have only rudimental knowledge about the detailed changes, using different 
scenarios about what an agreement could look like. 
 
Keck and Piermartini analysed the SADC EPA with the help of GTAP in 
2007, but back then, not only the precise tariff reductions and exceptions were 
unknown, but also Angola and Tanzania still belonged to the SADC EPA 
group. Only in November and December of that year the Interim Agreement 
was terminated, which was not joined by South Africa and would only be 
signed two years later (Bilal & Ramdoo 2010). For the EU, only the members 
of 2004 were included (thereby missing Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia). 
Additionally, they still used GTAP 6, in which Namibia could not be viewed 
independently of Lesotho and Swaziland. More importantly, with a reference 
year of 2001, the Cotonou Agreement was still fresh and the staged tariff 
elimination in the Agreement on Trade, Development and Cooperation 
between the EU and South Africa (ATDC) was far from being finished, which 
probably influenced the outcomes. 
The study lists the total welfare effects, measured as equivalent variation, 
which is composed from the gains of a more efficient reallocation, the terms of 
trade (caused by changing import- and export prices) and to smaller extents by 
changes in saving and investment and increased net revenues through tax 
pooling. Only South Africa has welfare gains through all scenarios the study 
puts up, the BLMNS group (short for Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia and Swaziland) has few small gains and several losses. 
 
                                                        
2
 The data base of GTAP is updated every few years. The most current data base is the GTAP 
9 Data Base, which includes data from 2011, while the most recent reference year in GTAP 8 is 
2007 and in GTAP 7 is 2004.  
 3 
 
Also in 2007, Perez and Karingi use GTAP to estimate “the impact of the 
EPAs on Sub-Saharan African economies, considering different levels of 
commitment in African tariff eliminations” (Perez & Karingi 2007, p. 1878), 
with a focus in changes in trade, welfare, industrial structures and prices, and 
fiscal revenues. They put up six scenarios, assuming 1) mutual total 
elimination of tariffs, 2) tariff alignments of the ACP countries to the EU level, 
3) regional integration in the EPA groups, 4) full tariff elimination with 
increased taxes and 5+6) tariff elimination of 80% resp. 60% of the EU imports 
towards the ACP. Results are mostly presented for all ACP countries in sum 
with some addendums on the special role of South Africa or the SADC group. 
Since at that time the majority African countries are captured through regional 
composites, for which the data is derived from a representative economy, they 
see the accuracy and detail as limited.  
 
In 2008, when Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland and Mozambique 
had signed a bilateral interim EPA, Morrissey and Zgovu (2008) analysed this 
with a partial equilibrium model, limited on the effects of agriculture. Three 
effects are summed up after the tariff reduction causes lowered prices for 
imports from the EU: The lower prices cause an increased total consumption 
(consumption effects). Where the EU is a more efficient producer, the tariff 
reduction allows a redirection of trade towards this more efficient supplier 
(trade creation). Where the EU has higher production costs and is only 
favoured after the agreement because it has lower tariffs, imports are deflected 
towards the EU although being a less efficient supplier (trade diversion). These 
three effects are summed up to get the whole welfare effect. From the SADC 
EPA group only Mozambique and South Africa are analysed. Without the 
exclusion of sensitive products, they both have a small welfare gain (0.003 
resp. 0.006% of the GDP) – with the exclusion of sensitive products South 
Africa keeps its gains, but Mozambique loses welfare (0.001% of the GDP). At 
the same time, Mozambique loses 0.44% respectively 0.23% (excluding 
sensitive products) of the GDP in tariff revenues and South Africa loses 0.15% 
in both cases. The author sees enough time for tax substitutions, as the 
countries would have at least ten years to implement the tariff reduction. 
 
By 2009 the details of the interim EPA were accessible, which plans an 
86% tariff reduction for Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland within 
two years, an 80.5% reduction for Mozambique within one year and no entry 
of the agreement for South Africa. On this basis, Vollmer et al. (2009) analyse 
the effects of several EPA agreements for several Sub-Saharan partners, among 
them Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique. They avoided a CGE study due to 
 4 
 
the lack of sufficiently detailed data (Vollmer et al. 2009) – and indeed, from 
the 10 African countries they planned to analyse, 5 were not included in the 
then latest version of GTAP, GTAP 7 (Purdue University, 2007). In the partial 
equilibrium analysis based on a framework by Milner et al. (2005), they 
compare the import demand from partner countries, the EU and the rest of the 
world under decreasing tariffs for the EU. Also here, the welfare is measured 
as the sum of consumption, trade diversion and trade creation effects. Namibia, 
Botswana and Mozambique all gain welfare from a full liberalization. While 
Namibia and Botswana almost achieve their full potential with the interims 
EPA, the more limited liberalization of Mozambique leaves the country with 
smaller benefits to its welfare. 
 
Fontagné, Laborde and Mitoritonne (2011) use the same partial equilibrium 
model as Vollmer et al., but introduced further constrains and modelling to 
keep consistency between demand at the detailed level and at the sectoral level 
of GTAP. Instead of looking at the interim EPA, they construct two scenarios 
of agreements that would align with the liberalization requirements: one that 
protects the local agriculture, one that protects the tariff revenues. According to 
their results, the SADC group takes away rather small revenue losses in 
comparison with the other ACP (in the scenario of agricultural protection it 
still is 58%) 
Just like the approach by Vollmer et al., the focus is on the demand side. 
This means that welfare effects on the supply side are not considered. The 
supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic (Fontagné, Laborde & Mitoritonne 
2011) which means for the suppliers in the ACP countries that even a small 
price decrease would have a strong effect. Even if the Armington conditions 
causes local consumers to stick to their local products to some extent, a 
suddenly lowered income price could cause the local production to collapse. 
But while benefits and losses for the consumers and the state budget are 
reflected, these welfare effects on the producers’ side are missing. 
 
Angelo (2013) analyses the impacts of all EPAs at once with the help of 
GTAP. For reasons of clarity and comprehensibility this requires strong 
aggregation, in this case towards only four sectors and a single region for the 
whole SADC EPA group. Four scenarios are set up, comparing the EPAs with 
and without regional integration with the alternative trade regimes (the general 
system of preferences, GSP and the everything but arms agreement, EBA) with 
and without regional integration.  
She puts emphasis on the deteriorated balance of trade for the ACP 
countries (decreasing for the SADC EPA group with both EPA scenarios, 
 5 
 
increasing without EPA), deindustrialization (production in industry decreases 
by 1.2% resp. 0.8% in both EPA scenarios while other sectors rise – while 
under the alternative scenario, all sectors shrink) and revenue losses (30.0 to 
32.7% loss for SADC with the EPA, 0.3 to 3.8% loss without the EPA). On the 
positive side she shows a higher employment for unskilled labour, positive 
welfare effect (measured as equivalent variation), a trade creation that 
dominates trade diversion and a real GDP growth.  
 
This list of studies is not exhaustive. Some models are not described in 
further detail, as they analyse EPAs, but do not give conclusions for the current 
SADC EPA group, such as the one by Bouët, Laborde and Mevel (2007). 
Other papers, such as the analysis by Ramdoo (2014), who compared the EPAs 
of West African States (ECOWAS EPA) with the SADC EPA in 2014, bring 
up interesting possible issues around the SADC EPA, but do not set up a model 
to measure or calculate any effects. And finally, there are several papers older 
than ten years, which Perenz (2006) summed up as being mostly based on 
partial equilibrium models, showing the European exports as the main 
beneficiaries. Less non-European suppliers export to the ACP countries, the 
welfare of the ACP consumers would boost, public revenue losses are often 
emphasized, and in some cases the producers in the ACP countries experience 
a relative loss of economic efficiency. Also, according to Perez (2006), general 
equilibrium analyses have rarely been used to estimate the impacts of EPAs 
before 2006. These studies naturally face even more lack of trade data and 
have no possible access to details of the trade agreement.  
 
Consequently, according to the best knowledge of the author, there is no 
analysis of the conclusive SADC EPA, and in general little few studies that 
focus on the SADC EPA instead of giving a general overview over several 
different agreements. 
1.3 Research question and objectives 
 
In the course of the negotiations, what could have been a sober economic 
assessment turned into a heated ideological debate. NGOs labelled the EPAs as 
the “clean-out sale of Africa”
3
 (EPA-Kampagne 2007), while the EU Trade 
Commissioner Peter Mandelson and the EU Development Commissioner Louis 
Michel accused the campaigners to caricature the ACP countries as weak and 
                                                        
3
 German title of the press release of the EPA campaign, translation T.D. 
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helpless. To them, the ACP countries could only decide between EPAs and the 
unfavourable general system of preferences (GSP), so “[c]alling for an end to 
EPA negotiations when there is no credible alternative is playing poker with 
the livelihoods of those we are trying to help.” (Mandelson & Michel 2007, p. 
2). Protesters predicted sombre prospects once the EPAs would be in place and 
saw a wide range of alternatives, from more protectionism to more financial 
aid. 
The general question to be answered in this thesis is: Will the EPA affect 
the SADC EPA group as negative as the critics of the trade agreement affirm?  
 
To answer this, several macroeconomic effects that arouse concerns are 
assessed in detail: 
 Opponents argue that the state budgets will decrease, as less tariff 
revenues flow in. This effect is measured, as well as the possibility 
to even out tariff revenue losses with a tax reform 
 Opponents argue that while their barriers against imports fall away, 
the African partners are hardly capable of increasing their exports. 
This would distort the current accounts of the Southern African 
partners. These effects are investigated, also with special regard to 
the trade balance towards the EU and the terms of trade. 
 Opponents see the EU as a superior partner in trade, which harms 
the regional trade. They however disregard possible positive effects 
on production and exports if prices for intermediate inputs should 
decrease through an EPA. Both will be taken into account. 
 Opponents also worry about the agricultural sector and the industry, 
as both might not be competitive. To answer to this concern, several 
different parameters, such as value added, wages, production for 
export markets and domestic consumption and employment, are 
considered. 
 
With this kind of approach, this thesis differs from most other studies on the 
EPA: As the literature review showed, several studies focus on the calculation 
of welfare effects when analysing a trade agreement. This measurement is 
however too aggregated to answer precisely to the concerns of opponents of 
the agreement, neither is it an intuitive concept to non-economists
4
, which is 
why this thesis does not focus too much on this (elsewhere helpful) tool. 
                                                        
4
 In GTAP, welfare is measured in equivalent variation welfare effects. Equivalent variation is 
a way to measure the value of a change in monetary units value by asking the question, which 
change of a country’s wealth would have the same effect on the wellbeing of the country as the 
policy change. For this several welfare effects of the policy are summed up, including the 
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The research question as such also differs from another question that has 
been asked for the the EPAs before: Are the EPAs to be preferred over the 
GSP? Some studies compare the options of GSP and EPA and see a 
comparison to the Lomé status as unhelpful, since returning there is not an 
option (see e.g. Fontagné, Laborde and Mitaritonna 2011). This is however not 
the question of the campaigners, who don’t see the GSP system as the only 
alternative. It is also not the research question of this thesis, as the political 
decision in favour of the EPA is already finalized. 
 
The policy is analysed with a computable general equilibrium model, 
GTAP. After giving some backgrounds on the EPA (chapter 2), the choice and 
functioning of this model is explained (chapter 3) and a basic simulation of the 
EPA is conducted, that calculates the equilibrium reached ten years after the 
implementation of the EPA (chapter 4). To test its outcomes under varying 
conditions, further variations are made, that make adaptations to the local 
factor market and adaptions to the states response to revenue losses. This is 
supposed to at least partially substitute the lack of a sensitivity analysis, which 
cannot be done, as it requires an additional GEMPACK licence in GTAP. 
                                                                                                                                
combined changes of utility of household consumers and government from their purchase in 
goods and services and the domestic savings (Burfisher 2011: 100). Corong et al. (2017) explain 
in chapter 3.11 that the real aggregation is much more difficult, containing preference shifts, 
scaling factors, changes in allocative efficiency, changes in endowments, depreciation, changes in 
technology, changes in terms of trade and changes in population. Even if GTAP allows looking at 
these components of the welfare in a disaggregated way, these calculations give a rather 
inconvenient answer to concerns about diminishing regional trade, a more precarious situation for 
the farmers, etc. Additionally, the understanding of the term ‘welfare’ differs even among 
economists (as explained in the literature review, partial models use a different welfare 
assessment. For different welfare calculations in different CGE models, see Burfisher 2011, p. 95-
100) 
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2 Background 
In the following, an overview is made over the negotiations, the economic 
structure of the signatories, and the contents of the SADC EPA. The part on the 
negotiations is only adumbrated here, to keep the main text compact – a more 
detailed summary of the events, which can explain why the EPAs are so 
controversial, which alternatives were available, with which motivation the EU 
entered the negotiations over a trade agreement that goes beyond the 
requirements by the WTO, and why African countries agreed on terms that 
were strongly criticized by their civil society and several politicians, can 
instead be found in the Annex. The part on the economic structure on one hand 
is supposed to illuminate the decisions for the aggregation and the settings for 
the simulation
5
, on the other hand it provides the basis from which to 
understand the results of the simulation. The explanation of the contents of the 
SADC EPA is necessary to set up the shocks in the simulation. 
2.1 The EPA negotiations6 
From 2001 to 2007 the EU and the ACP countries were given time to 
negotiate the WTO-compatible EPAs (UNECA 2007). These agreements were 
not negotiated with all ACP countries at once, but with six regional groups, one 
of them being the here analysed group of Southern African countries.  
                                                        
5
 Before running an analysis in GTAP, the sectors, factors and regions have to be aggregated in 
a way that is likely to provide the most important information. For this simulation, this means e.g. 
that the service sector stays rather aggregated as the SADC EPA did not conclude tariff changes 
for the trade in services and that fish has its own sector, as it is of some importance to Namibia. 
Also, decisions about the sluggishness of the factors or the closure rules need to be made. For 
example, the unemployment is so high that it is considered in some variations of the model. The 
details of the aggregation can be found in the Appendix 7.3. A demonstration on how to change 
closure rules will be given in Appendix 7.6. 
6
 A much more detailed summary of the negotiations can be found in Appendix 7.1 
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The negotiations were pressurized not only by the WTO (e.g. through Latin 
American banana exporters who saw their trade with the EU in disadvantage 
compared to the ACP, see Meyn 2008), but also by the EU itself. The EU 
aimed for an agreement including “services and investment and trade-related 
areas such as trade facilitation, intellectual property and cooperation on 
competition policy” (Mandelson 2007, p. 1), which was neither demanded by 
the WTO, nor wanted by the ACP. Alternatives next to the dichotomy of 
‘either EPA or GSP’ were given little attention. Despite this hard course, a 
comprehensive agreement EPA with the whole SADC EPA Group including 
South Africa was successfully concluded on July 15
th
, 2014, signed by the EU, 
the SACU and the European Parliament in 2016, and ratified in 2017 also by 
Mozambique (European Commission 2017).  
2.2 Economic structure of the southern African 
partners7 
 
Although South Africa’s GDP (in PPP) lies between that of the Netherlands 
and Belgium and although some BLMNS countries have a GDP that is 
comparable to smaller economies in the European Union such as Estonia, 
Cyprus and Malta (Figure 3), the members of the SADC EPA group are much 
poorer than the members of the European Union: As shown in Figure 2, they 
have a much lower GDP per capita than the members of the EU, falling even 
below Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
The service sectors strongly contribute to the GDP in the SADC EPA group 
according to GTAP and other sources (Figure 7, Figure 4). Compared to the 
EU, the Southern African states have a bigger industrial and agricultural sector 
and a smaller service sector. Even if differences are not strong in the 
aggregation, countries like Mozambique (with an agricultural sector of 25% of 
the GDP) or Swaziland (with an industrial sector of 37%) might be affected 
strongly if the EPA places the agriculture or the industry in a competitive 
disadvantage.  
Food production is obviously important to several countries (Grains&Crops 
with 18% of the value added in Mozambique, but to some extent also 
Meat&Livestock with 5% in Botswana and Fish with 4% in Namibia, Figure 
7), but these numbers alone do not depict what a loss in the agricultural sector 
would mean to the countries. To understand this, the number of subsistence 
                                                        
7
 For graphs and sources to this chapter, please see the Appendix under 7.2 
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farmers has to be seen: According to the World Factbook by the CIA it 
employs the majority of the work force in Mozambique and Lesotho, 70% of 
the population in Swaziland, roughly two-thirds of the rural dwellers in 
Namibia and many people in Botswana. Even in South Africa there is a 
communal sector, where the majority of households are subsistance-based and 
use only limited amounts of external inputs and technology (Palmer & Ainslie 
2002). As we will later see, these farmers face higher challenges when it comes 
to intersectoral mobility, which is then reflected in the first variation of the 
simulation. 
The industry might not appear very large in the BLMNS countries, yet it 
exists and is fostered: The World Factbook states e.g. that Lesotho’s narrow 
economic base depends, apart from agriculture, remittances, and regional 
customs revenue, also on textile manufacturing. 
Similarly, the dependency on extraction does not become visible by only 
looking at its contribution to the GDP: While Botswana’s dependency on 
diamond mining is visible by the share of the GDP (the extraction sector of 
25% of the value added, Figure 7), Namibia’s dependency on extraction seems 
more moderate with 9% of the value added. To see the real relevance of this 
sector, one has to know 50% of its exchange earnings come from there (CIA 
2017c).  
 
The primary and secondary sectors are a bigger source of income to 
unskilled workers (Figure 6), which are the majority in the African partner 
states (except for South Africa, they contribute more to the value added, 
despite their assumably lower wages). 
Furthermore, roughly a quarter of the population is unemployed (according 
to the World Factbook: Botswana: 20%, but higher according to unofficial 
estimations, Lesotho: 28%, Mozambique: 22%, Namibia: 28%, Swaziland: 
28%, South Africa 26%, but higher among the black youth). This makes the 
GTAP assumption of full employment questionable, which is why this 
assumption is dropped in some variations of the simulation.  
 
Exports contribute between 39% and 44% to the GDP of almost all 
countries, only Botswana is significantly deviating (28%) (Figure 5). Only 
Lesotho&Swaziland have a trade surplus. The region in economically 
integrated via SADC and (except for Mozambique) the SACU. Even if the 
trade within the region does not become strongly apparent in Figure 8 and 
Figure 9, the regional trade of the SADC EPA group is bigger than to be 
expected according to their importance in the world trade (to be seen in the 
intra-regional trade index of over 1 in Table 17).  The region is also connected 
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to other African states - McDonald and Walmsley (2003) name, apart from the 
SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and 
the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI) as the most important ones. However, with a 
closer look at import sources and export destinations in the GTAP database, it 
becomes clear that the BLMNS are not so much integrated with each other or 
other African countries, but mostly have strong ties to South Africa.  
Furthermore, there are two important agreements with the European Union: 
the Everything But Arms Agreement (EBA), that extensively abolishes tariffs 
for exports from least developed countries such as Lesotho and Mozambique, 
and the trade agreement with South Africa (ATDC). While the African 
countries are only a minor trading partner for the EU, the trade flows from and 
to the EU make a big share of the Southern African trade flows. 25% of South 
Africa's exports are directed at the EU markets, and for the BLMNS countries 
it ranges from 37% (Lesotho & Swaziland) to 70% (Botswana) (Figure 9). 
These exports are coming from the extraction sector (especially from 
Botswana), from Heavy Manufacturing (especially from Mozambique) and to 
smaller extents also from processed food and services (Figure 10). The 
Southern African states also heavily rely on EU imports, here South Africa the 
most with 34% of its imports and Mozambique the least with 21% (Figure 8). 
These mostly come from the manufacturing and service sector (Figure 12). 
2.3 The new SADC EPA 
The SADC EPA makes changes to trade policies, such as tariffs, tariff rate 
quotas (TRQ)
8
 and rules of origin (RoO). As mentioned before, the agreement 
additionally contains paragraphs on issues such as domestic environmental and 
labour protection, development aid, intellectual property rights, etc. However, 
a mere CGE-analysis has to settle for the implementation trade policies.  
 
Even if negotiated together, the SADC EPA does not give a uniform trade 
scheme: When South Africa exports to the EU, they face slightly higher tariffs 
then the BLMNS group, while when the EU exports to the SADC EPA group, 
Mozambique is granted a higher tariff protection than the other members. An 
overview of the tariff reductions can be seen in Table 19. 
While a wide range of tariffs is completely eliminated, some sensitive 
goods stay protected by sticking to the previous tariff, defining a new tariff or 
                                                        
8
 A TRQ is a two-tier tariff: a lower tariff for a certain quantity of goods, and a higher tariff – 
usually the MFN tariff – for all imports beyond the quota 
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applying a TRQ, and some tariffs change within a longer schedule, giving the 
affected sectors time to adapt (see Appendix 7.4) 
 
Rules of Origin (RoO) are a crucial determinant when trade agreements are 
supposed to support regional integration or enable supply chains between 
countries that cannot sustain a complete production network on themselves. 
They are hard to model, but should, whenever possible, still be considered in 
the simulation of trade agreements (a little excursion on this can be found in 
Appendix 7.7). However, there are no changes in them that could be modelled: 
The rules of origin under Lomé and Cotonou were largely the GSP standards 
with some minor improvements (Naumann 2008) and went through some 
major revisions for the IEPA (Naumann 2012). These RoO were not changed 
anymore for the final EPA
9
. Since they are thereby still the same rules since 
2008, they are indirectly taken into account in the trade streams that GTAP 9 
uses (based on data for 2012)
10
 and cannot be modelled any further. 
 
Additionally, the EU aims at development cooperation (Part I, Chapter III, 
Article 12 of the agreement), without determining an exact amount. As Bilal & 
Roza (2007) explain, these can only assist governments during their adjustment 
process, will not permanently even out the revenue losses, and countries still 
have to engage in the adjustment process. 
2.4 Concerns about the EPA 
2.4.1 A declining state budget 
The EU committee of the French National Assembly warns in their report 
of 2006, that the EPA will cause a shock for the budget with the cessation of 
tariff incomes for the governments of the ACP states (Lefort 2006). Indeed, 
tariff revenues are a much more important source of state incomes in the 
African partner countries: While tariff revenues make less than 1% of the state 
budget in the European Union, they had a share between 11% (South Africa) 
and 69% (Botswana) of the state revenues before the EPA (data taken from 
                                                        
9
 This can be seen in MAcMAp under ‘Trade Agreements and Rules of Origin’ – a free 
account needs to be registered before entering this part of the page. 
10
 Although GTAP does not model the rules of origin, which limits the accuracy of simulations 
in which rules of origin are supposed to change (Perez 2006). 
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GTAP, see  Table 25)
11
. Other critics share this concern, pointing also to the 
fact that especially LDCs with high debt might experience very negative 
consequences on their development and poverty alleviation, even if the public 
revenues would just decrease by a few percentage points (Bilal & Roza 2007).  
Proponents of the agreement argue however that 
 The cessation of tariff incomes would not be immediate but take 
place over a longer time span. In the meantime, where tariffs are 
lower but not abolished, the stimulation of imports could even raise 
the tariff incomes (Bilal & Roza 2007) 
 Also tariffs are not planned to be taken away completely and will 
stay on a relatively high level compared to other developing 
countries nevertheless (Lefort 2006). 
 The additional growth through the trade agreement will even out 
the income losses through tariffs (Lefort 2006). As Bilal and Roza 
point out, if the agreement promotes growth, the additional tax 
revenue might be seen the later, the slower the elimination process 
of tariffs in scheduled. 
 Tariffs would work as a source of corruption, as they guarantee a 
constant cash flows for those who manage to stay in power (Lefort 
2006) 
Proponents of the EPA also note that often only a small share of tariffs 
would be collected, and that the tax administration in developing countries 
would often be inefficient (Bilal & Roza 2007). The ACP countries should 
collect tariffs and other revenues more efficiently to even out the losses, or use 
the EPAs as an impetus to reform their tax systems (in this context, Lefort 
(2006) comments on the lack of betterment levies in several countries, but also 
on the extreme case of fiscal paradises). To take this suggestion into account, 
the second variation of the model explicitly introduces a tax that evens out all 
tariff revenue losses. 
2.4.2 A deterioration to the current account 
The report by the EU committee of the French National Assembly argues 
that the opening of the economy mainly means an opening of the ACP markets 
to European products, and not so much the other way around (Lefort 2006): 
The quasi-duty-free access to the European market, that Sub-Saharan exporters 
                                                        
11
 The numbers by GTAP are flawed, since they do not consider the revenue sharing formula 
between the SACU countries into account. According to the World Factbook, 49% of the 
government revenue of Swaziland and 44% of the government revenue in Lesotho come from 
SACU custom duties – unlike their theoretical ‘own’ tariff revenues of 18,6% in GTAP. 
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enjoyed through the Lomé-Scheme, respectively the EBA initiative, did not 
lead to a strong share of ACP trade in the EU market or diverse economic 
structures (Ramdoo 2014, Perez & Karingi 2007), since not high tariffs, but 
high transaction costs and supply-side rigidities keep African exporters from 
making use of the market access (Perez & Karingi 2007). Additionally, the 
regulatory landscape of the EU might de-facto limit their access to EU markets 
(Ramdoo 2014): Mayn (2008) names here the increasingly stringent food 
safety standards decrease the exports in traditional ACP sectors such as fish, 
meat, fruit, vegetables, spices, oil and horticultural products. If indeed imports 
from the EU can enter the APC countries more easily, without creating much 
new exports for the area, this would have a negative effect on the trade balance 
and thereby impairing the current account of these areas (Lefort 2006). 
 
But not only the absolute amounts of imports and exports matter, also the 
purchasing power of a country’s exports (Burfisher 2011). If the country’s 
export goods gain in value, while the price of import goods stay the same, a 
country can “buy more imports for its exports” – this ratio of export prices to 
import prices is called the terms of trade. The report by the EU committee of 
the French National Assembly warns that the EPA could have a negative effect 
on the terms of trade: the real exchange rate of ACP countries with a flexible 
exchange rate would decrease, reducing their purchasing power for foreign 
goods (Lefort 2006). 
2.4.3 Diminishing regional trade 
During the negotiations, the regional economic communities (REC) were 
supposed to self-determine a regional trading agreement, since “regional 
integration is a key instrument for the integration of ACP countries into the 
world economy” (European Commission 2000, Article 35,2). Such an 
agreement would be a free trade area or a custom union (United Nations 2011). 
But opponents of the SADC EPA argued that the SADC EPA gives some 
challenges to the emerging of Intra-African custom unions. Oxfam illustrates 
that with the ATDC: When South Africa agreed on lowering their tariffs 
towards the EU, the other SACU members were forced to adapt their tariffs 
due to the common external tariff of the SACU (Godfrey 2006). Similarly, any 
non-EPA countries that would want to form a custom union with an EPA 
country would have to adapt their tariffs towards the EU to EPA standards 
without benefiting of the preferential market access. Oxfam’s argumentation 
ignores that regional integration is not only possible with custom unions, but 
also over free trade areas (which do not require a common external tariff). 
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Such a free trade area in fact evolved with the Tripartite Free Trade Area, 
concluded by the SADC, the EAC and the COMESA, which was signed in 
2015 and could be approved by the national parliaments in 2017 (BBC 2015). 
Oxfam also argues that countries that are not inside an EPA, but want to form a 
regional group with an EPA country, would not be able to protect themselves 
from the liberalized imports from the EU without erecting barriers against their 
neighbours (Godfrey 2006). However, this could be done with rules of origin. 
 
Nevertheless, in a more straightforward fashion, locally produced 
commodities could be crowded out by the increasing imports of European 
goods, as warned by Lefort (2006) and supported by the analysis by Perez and 
Karingi (2007).  
But not only consumers, also producers could be allured by the new market 
access, that gives security over a long lasting duty-free regime (opposed to an 
inner-African market with only regional trade agreements and a generally low 
level of trade). African exporters might prefer this new accessible destination 
and be further discouraged from inner-African trade (Ramdoo 2014). 
2.4.4 A hazard to the infant industry 
The deficiencies in infrastructure make energy, water, transportation and 
electricity costlier in Africa, which makes it harder for the local industry to be 
competitive (Lefort 2006). Opponents of the agreement, such as the fair-trade 
organisation Traidcraft, the Trades Union Congress and the organisation 
‘Action for South Africa’, warn that the EPAs will harm the industry sector, 
naming several examples of African countries where liberalisation led to job 
losses and deteriorating labour standards (ACTSA 2007). Proponents argue 
that good “trade links with growing and technologically sophisticated markets 
can boost domestic productivity growth” (Bacchetta 2012). Through positive 
spill over effects economic reforms could be realized and private investors 
might invest in the local economy to reap the benefits of the EU market 
(Ramdoo 2014). 
2.4.5 A hazard to agriculture 
As European producers are more competitive through mechanization, they 
are expected to take over the market (Bilal & Roza 2007). Such shifts of 
production towards more productive areas is a normal and wanted process 
within trade agreements, as consumers are expected to benefit from cheaper 
imports (while the inferior country shifts to producing more of the goods it has 
 16 
 
a comparative advantage in). However, when it comes to agriculture, several 
countries prefer to exclude goods as sensitive in favour of the rural population 
and their small incomes (ibid.). There are several reasons for this: 
 The agricultural sector keeps relatively many people out of poverty 
providing employment (ibid.). The abilities to switch into more 
beneficial sectors is limited for many smallholders, as certain 
structures, such as gender-specific labour division, are unlikely to 
change
12
 
 By creating incomes, export revenues and employment, but also 
sometimes directly by supplying foodstuffs, a weakened agriculture 
sector can even affect the food security in countries, both by 
influencing food availability and access (Matthews 2010). 
 Even if the EPA agreements would lower factor prices or lower 
prices for imported goods, those make only a small share of the 
expenditures of self-sustaining farmers – so the risks of losing their 
basis of existence could not be evened out by price effects that 
other consumers benefit of (Lefort 2006).  
 If the sector is destabilized through a harsher competition, this 
could lead to rural exodus and a stronger forming of slums (Lefort 
2006). 
 
McDonald and Walmsley (2003) suggest that if the EU is serious about 
assisting African development through trade agreements, it should be aware of 
the importance of the liberalisation of trade in food and agricultural products. 
 
                                                        
12
 The UNCTAD notes that trade liberalization usually favours agricultural exports over the 
production of food crops (Peters 2005). The switch towards cash crops are often more difficult for 
women, as they tend to be smallholders and face difficulties in their property rights for land and 
their access to credits, fertilizers and other resources (Peters 2005). Whether female or not, 
smallholders additionally have greater difficulty in complying with sanitary and phytosanitary as 
well as environmental standards (Peters 2005). Differences like these might put smallholders and 
subsistence farmers in a very different start position when it comes to adaptation to a trade 
agreement (Peters 2005). Consequently, case studies would show that benefits of liberalization in 
developing countries have largely accrued to medium- and large-scale farmers in sectors where 
often only a few farmers and employees are female (Peters 2005). 
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3 Methodology 
In this chapter, the methodology behind the analysis is explained. The model 
that is used is the standard GTAP model, a Computable General Equilibrium 
model (CGE) where several factors, sectors and regions interact. First, the 
advantages of using a CGE for the intended analysis are presented. This is 
followed by a short overview over the most important elements of GTAP 
(without the aspiration to give a convenient explanation of the logic behind 
GTAP within a view paragraphs – for a thorough explanation, Hertel (1997) is 
the recommended source). And finally, the many limits of the scope of such an 
analysis are explained. 
3.1 Choice of the model 
A broad range of models have been created to analyse the economic 
impacts of policy changes.
13
 As could be seen in the literature review, partial 
equilibrium models are a commonly used for trade policies like the EPA. 
Why is instead an economy-wide model preferred here?  
As Perez & Karingi (2007) point out, changed tariffs and quotas do not only 
affect the sector they are applied on, but also the sectors that supply 
intermediate inputs to this production as well as sectors that depend on the 
output of the influenced sector. These forward and backward linkages make it 
necessary to use a model that captures inter- and intra-sectoral changes, which 
then is given with a general equilibrium methodology (ibid.). Partial 
                                                        
13
 Theoretically, one could also discuss the usage of approaches that are not models based on 
economic theory, such as time series projection. Time series projections extrapolate historical 
data to forecast the future, but they emphasise more statistical behaviour than underpinnic the 
economic theory behind behavioural equations (van Tongeren, van Meijl, Surry 2001: 152). 
Naturally, they are thereby more useful in situations where there are no external shocks distorting 
the current trends. 
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equilibrium models do not allow factors to move between sectors and demands 
to interact, and can thereby not provide a complete representation of national 
economies and their trade relations with other economies (van Tongeren, van 
Meijl & Surry 2001). These trade relations also contain important welfare 
effects such as the terms of trade, which would be ignored in a partial 
equilibrium model (Fontagné, Laborde & Mitaritonna 2011). Fontagné, 
Laborde and Mitaritonna (2011) add that partial models widely used by the 
World Bank, such as SMART and TRITS, do not link products and countries, 
but look at one market at a time and can, without further constrains, create 
inconsistent results, such as a total trade diversion that is bigger than the initial 
level of imports. 
 
Among the economy-wide models, not only CGE like GTAP are available, 
but also macro-economic models and input-output models. Since macro-
economic models however focus on phenomena such as inflation and exchange 
rates and input-output models lack the behavioural response of producers, 
consumers, importers, exporters and possibly other actors, CGE models are 
favourable here (van Tongeren, van Meijl & Surry 2001). This is especially 
true in developing countries, where agricultural activity has a high share in the 
economy: As trade liberalization policies are more likely to cause significant 
second-round effects, AGE models are the only coherent option for the 
analysis (ibid.). 
In short, in case of an ex ante assessment of the effect of a multilateral 
market access change, a CGE model seems to be the most appropriate 
methodology (Bacchetta et al. 2012). 
 
Within a model, several assumptions can be made about the market. E.g. if 
the products are considered to be heterogeneous, intra-industry trade can be 
explained in a better fashion (van Tongeren, van Meijl & Surry 2001). A 
heterogeneity can e.g. be installed by monopolistic competition (where high 
fixed costs create a situation that only allows a limited number of firms – that 
then can benefit from scale economies – to imperfectly compete in the market) 
or by imperfect substitution fashion (ibid.). Imperfect competition is a likely 
choice to model trade liberalizations of services and increasingly to model 
liberalization of manufactures (ibid.).  
In the standard GTAP version the products are limited substitutes through 
the Armington assumption. There are several whole extensions for GTAP to 
adapt the model closer to real economic situations, e.g. to allow monopolistic 
competition or Cournot oligopoly with scale economies (GTAP-IRTS), firm 
heterogeneity (GTAP-HET), or a recursive dynamic version of GTAP (GDyn) 
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(Corong et al. 2017). Other extensions allow a better focus on policies e.g. in 
the agricultural sector, labour migration or poverty (ibid.).  
 
The CGE that is used here is the standard GTAP model, a multiregion, 
multisector, computable general equilibrium model. The data and model used 
here are derived from the GTAP 9 database, which includes 57 sectors, 140 
regions and 8 factors. 
3.2 Theoretical framework of GTAP 
The GTAP model is explained by in the ‘GTAP-book’ (Hertel 1997). 
Brockmeier (2001) provides a graphical exposition of the whole model. 
General explanations about CGE modelling, with many helpful examples for 
the GTAP model, are given by Burfisher (2011). Since the model was 
developed further over time, Corong et al (2007) gives a comprehensive 
documentation of the model for version 7. 
 
GTAP is built on two kinds of equations. The behavioural equations are 
based on microeconomic theory and reflect the reactions of optimizing agents, 
such as consumers and producers on international and domestic markets while 
the accounting relationships ensure that the receipts and expenditures of 
consumers, producers, and the government are balanced (Brockmeier 2001, 
Perez & Karingi 2007).  
Additionally, there are model closures, which define which variables are 
exogenous and which are endogenous (Burfisher 2011). They can be changed 
to adapt the model to different economic environments or periods of 
adjustment (Corong et al. 2017). For instance, the macroeconomic closure 
describes whether savings or investments adjust to maintain the identity that 
savings equals investment (Burfisher 2011). In the default closures of the 
GTAP model, the quantity of savings changes with income at an exogenously 
given savings rate, which causes the investments to adapt (ibid.). Consumers 
do hence not increase their demand for consumption goods as much as they 
would in the investment-driven model, instead this rather results in an increase 
in the production of machinery and equipment (ibid.). This default macro 
closure is kept for the analysis. The “standard closure of the model is a 
classical representation of the global economy, with constant returns to scale, 
perfect competition, and a systematic adjustment between supply and demand 
through prices.” (Perez 2006, p. 1003). 
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Within the behavioural equations, several elasticities are used – not only to 
describe consumers’ reactions (price elasticities), but also to explain for 
instance with how much ease factors move across industries when wages or 
rents are changing (factor mobility elasticity). GTAP assumes that the factor 
mobility stays the same for all ratios of factor employment and all levels of 
aggregate factor supply (it uses CET functions) (Burfisher 2011), and similarly 
assumes constant elasticities of substitution (it uses CES functions)
14
. A special 
elasticity that should be mentioned is the Armington elasticity: GTAP uses 
variants of the Armington assumption to model intra-industry trade (Keck & 
Piermartini 2007). The Armington assumption – namely that domestic and 
imported goods from different regions are imperfect substitutes – is 
incorporated in GTAP by differentiating products on the basis of their country 
of origin (Kone 2008). Firms, consumers and the government decide their 
amount of imported goods (and their compilation among the imported goods) 
according to this elasticity of substitution. 
3.3 Limits to the model and scope of the research 
2.4.1 On the translation of the agreement into shocks 
The tariffs in the agreement are aggregated with the help of TASTE, a 
program that adapts detailed trade and tariff data to GTAP-related purposes.  
In the EPA, all commodities are listed with their code of the harmonized 
system. 
This system describes product categories with decreasing detail the more 
number are added (see 
Figure 1). It is called 
“harmonized” as all 
member countries of 
the World Customs 
Organization (WCO) 
share the same 
description down to the 
                                                        
14
 This is not to say that substitution is possible anywhere. For example, the production 
functions are assumed to have a fixed ratio of value added and intermediate inputs (taking the 
form or a Leontief function), and nested in that another Leontief-function for the composition of 
intermediate inputs. But within the value added nest, the decisions for different primary factors 
are according to a CES function, and so are the decisions between the imported and domestic kind 
of an intermediate input. 
06 Live trees, plants, bulbs, roots, cut flowers, etc 
0603 Out flowers, dried flowers for bouquets, etc 
060313 Fresh orchids 
Figure 1: Example of numbers of the harmonized system, 
here showing the chapter (HS2, 2 digits), heading (HS4, 4 
digits) and subheading (HS6, 6 digits) 
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subheading (HS6) and report their trade data for HS6 to UNCTAD (Bacchetta 
2012). 
 
Even if the EPA agreement sometimes defines tariffs beyond the 
subheading, only tariffs up to HS6 can be considered, as levels beyond that are 
neither harmonized, nor is there data on their trade flows in the COMTRADE 
or the TASTE database. The exceptions in the agreement that are detailed on 
HS8 or beyond are hence mostly calculated to experience the same tariff 
change as their superordinate subheading
15
. The attribution became 
additionally intricate by tariffs that are not ad valorem, but specific tariffs, 
mixed tariffs or tariff rate quotas. These tariffs are recalculated as explained in 
the Appendices 7.4 and 7.5. The weighting of the tariffs to aggregate the HS 
system into the GTAP sectors can also attract criticism, as weighting by import 
shares typically suffers from both, trade fluctuations and the endogeneity bias 
(the tariff influences the imports – in the extreme case, a prohibitive tariff has 
zero imports and is thereby not included at all in the average). As explained in 
further detail in the Appendix 7.4, TASTE tackles this issue at least to some 
extent with referent group weights. 
2.4.2 Reliability of the data behind GTAP 
 
The source of the data behind GTAP is explained in detail in Gehlhar et al. 
(1997). Although “GTAP is supported by a strong group of institutional 
stakeholders which puts high requirements on the quality, timeliness and 
documentation of the data” (van Tongeren, van Meijl & Surry 2001), its 
reliability is sometimes contested. 
Especially parameters that can only be observed indirectly, such as 
elasticities, can easily be questioned and strongly affect the outcome. Zhang 
(2006) shows that the terms of trade found in the simulation depend on the 
height of the Armington elasticity, and that this also seems to be the case for 
the comparably complex two-tier Armington substitution used by GTAP. Perez 
and Karingi (2007) conclude, regarding Zhang’s results, that it is important to 
bear in mind that the results if CGE simulations depend on the magnitude of 
various parameters. 
                                                        
15
 Which becomes arbitrary in case the subheading only consists of ‘exceptions’ without a 
clear majority for one rule. In some cases with obvious ongoing protection the initial tariff was 
simply kept, in other cases an attribution was made according to the best understanding of the 
author. See Appendix 7.4 for more detail. 
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But even directly measured, statistical data over trade flows and tax 
collection might not be as realistic as desired: Gehlhar et al. (1997) explains 
that subsidies towards the agricultural sector are often designed flexibly, so 
that they can react to the strong volatility for this sector (as supply elasticities 
caused e.g. by the weather, exchange rate volatility and price-inelastic demand 
contribute to world price volatility), while GTAP only measures this support 
with an average over several years, representative of the late 1980s. 
Furthermore, Fontagné, Laborde and Mitaritonna (2011) and Bilal and Roza 
(2007) all note that there is an imperfect tax collection; which, as Perez and 
Karingi (2007) add, are recognized in many African countries affected by 
EPAs. They might be legitimate (food aid, diplomatic services, exemptions e.g. 
for export-processing zones, public and private investment goods, etc.), 
unintended (red tape) or illegal (corruption, smuggling) and lead to a gap 
between the theoretical tariff duty receipts and the practical ones. This can put 
a bias in two directions: the state budget could be affected even worse than 
expected (if the tariff collection becomes e.g. even harder for the remaining 
goods that have a tariff) or the negative effect might be overstated (if tariff 
revenues were in fact already low before and the state can improve its revenues 
with administrative reforms). 
2.4.3 Missing dynamic effects 
The idea behind having staging categories for different commodities, which 
allows tariffs to be eliminated in steps over a longer time, is that the local 
industry has time to catch up in their competitive capacities. This GTAP 
analysis is however comparative static in scope and does not take account of 
dynamic effects triggered by further liberalization. A dynamic model could 
allow capital to accumulate and take into account that policies can accelerate 
the pace of technical innovation, which the WTO calls two of the most 
powerful sources of economic growth (Piermartini & The 2005). Examples for 
such effects are “increased competition, economies of scale, improvements of 
the investment climate and technological change” (Keck & Piermartini 2007, 
p. 89). But not only positive effects are missed: GTAP fails to capture some of 
the costs associated with the transition, such as retaining, temporary 
unemployment, the retooling of capital or even the impossibility to transfer 
specialized capital (Piermartini & The 2005). These periods of unemployment 
and dislocation could exact a high societal price (Burfisher 2011). When the 
EPA includes several measurements that are supposed to make it easier for the 
African partners – like slow tariff elimination over several years or slowly 
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increasing tariff rate quotas – the GTAP results cannot tell us whether these 
measurements could alleviate negative side effects of the agreement.  
Even tariff revenues can be affected by the fact that the simulation “jumps” 
over the ten years in this simulation, as the lowered tariffs, as long as they are 
not down to zero, can stimulate imports and thereby create higher tariff 
revenue – depending on the initial height of the tariffs and the elimination 
process (Bilal & Roza 2007). 
2.4.4 On the structure of CGE models 
CGE models are based on economic theory and hence require many 
assumptions regarding the database, behavioural equations and parameters – 
which is the root of much scepticism and criticism (Gehlhar 1998). GTAP for 
example doesn’t allow primary factors (like labour or capital) to move across 
borders or change in amount, although worker’s migration or capital 
accumulation are obviously existing occurrences in the real world. On the other 
hand, factors like agricultural land and capital can be employed in a different 
sector within one country, which would normally not be done in short- or 
medium-term models (van Tongeren, van Meijl & Surry 2001). There are no 
domestic margins (such as transport costs), no foreign income receipts or 
payments, no remittances and no international aid flows, no transfers or 
property income receipts in the governments’ accounts (Corong et al. 2017) 
 
A frequent issue of criticism is the Armington elasticities. The Armington 
model uses imperfect substitution, but not for each firm, but rather for each 
country of origin (van Tongeren, van Meijl & Surry 2001). This means the 
consumers’ preferences are fixed exogenously. An unrealistic feature about the 
Armington Model is that even very small importers are able to influence world 
market prices (ibid.). Another problem of this set-up of the model is fact that 
trade flows with a value of zero (which exist for some commodities traded 
between SADC countries, in the aggregation used in this thesis e.g. in the fish 
sector) cannot turn into non-zero trade flows under that setup of the model 
(Keck & Piermartini 2007). There are alternative models that have tried to 
endogenously explain the ties between certain import and export relationships, 
such as the gravity model
16
. Kuiper and van Tongeren (2007) have tried to 
                                                        
16
 Gravity models assume that economically big countries trade more with each other and trade 
less with increasing trade costs. Just like gravity is a formula of the masses of two bodies divided 
by the square of their distance, the volume of trade between any two countries is approximated 
with a formula of their economic size divided by the trade costs (generated out of different 
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combine the Armington formulation with an econometrically estimated gravity 
model to solve the “small shares stay small” problem.  
 
A possible point of criticism could also be the missing nominal exchange 
rate in GTAP. However, GTAP does have a real exchange rate mechanism: A 
change in the relative factor prices across countries reflects “changes in the 
relative prices of goods that are similar in effect to a change in the real 
exchange rate” (Burfisher 2011, p. 155). This way, if a shock causes factor 
prices to depreciate in one country, this country becomes more competitive as 
an exporter, with similar effects to a nominal exchange rate depreciation 
(ibid.). 
 
Some assumptions and mathematical issues that are objectionable can be 
solved with adapted closures, additional shocks and setting in the model. For 
example, the precision of the approximations of changes in GTAP
17
 or the 
aggregation bias after the usage of TASTE
18
 have solutions within the 
programs that are used. Other inadequacies are inherent in the GTAP model. It 
should however be positively noted that the accuracy of GTAP was tested in a 
backcast simulation over developments in the Pacific Rim, where Gehlhar 
(1998) saw a good correlation between GTAP predictions and real changes of 
export shares
19
. 
                                                                                                                                
variables, including not only distance, but also dummies for islands, landlocked countries, 
common language, colonial connection, and so on) (Piermartini & The 2005). 
17
 Most of the relationships are expressed in terms of value, such as the value of exports, the 
value of domestic purchases by the government or the value of a certain factor employed by a 
production sector. For this, the equations must be linearized via total differentiation. The model 
itself, despite its linear representation, stays non-linear – the linearized form is just a good 
approximation for small changes. To improve the approximation for bigger changes, the model is 
solved several times in small steps. A more detailed and graphical explanation of this can be 
found in Hertel, Tsigras 1997, chapter V, complemented by Corong et al. (2017), under the 
headline “implementation”. 
18
 The TASTE documentation warns that potentially neither of the possible set of weights “is 
consistent with the GTAP data, giving rise to potential problems of aggregation bias: tariff shocks 
might be wrongly influenced by the level of user aggregation. To combat this problem, you have 
the option of scaling the chosen set of weights so that they sum to the GTAP database trade 
matrix VIWS.” (Horridge & Laborde 2010, p. 9) 
19
 Gehlhar (1998) tested how well GTAP would predict the export share changes of the Pacific 
Rim. For this, he returned the endowment levels to their 1982 levels, then ran different 
simulations for the next ten years and compared the predicted export shares with the real values of 
1992. He could show that with some easy adaptations, the model performs fairly well: When all 
his suggested adaptations were used, the correlation coefficients between predicted and real 
values were 0.78 for all countries, with coefficient values of up to 0.97 for specific countries. 
Rapid structural changes, such as a rapid deterioration in the oil price, impaired the ability of 
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4 Policy simulation 
In this chapter, the settings concerning the actual simulation are explained. 
GTAP 9 has data for 140 regions, 57 sectors and 8 factors. Before making any 
kind of simulation, in order to reduce the magnitude of the calculations, these 
regions, sectors and factors need to be aggregated down to the ones that are 
relevant for the research question (normally not more than 10 sectors and 10 
regions). This aggregation is described in the following. The five simulations 
implement the same tariff shocks (i.e. the tariff reductions that are defined in 
the EPA agreements), but they apply different settings concerning the closure 
rules and the elasticities. This serves the purpose of gaining results for different 
economic circumstances (like unemployment, sluggish factor mobility or a tax 
reform). The basic simulation and the variations are explained in 4.1. Finally, it 
is explained how the SADC EPA is translated into shocks. 
4.1 Aggregation scheme20 
The regions in GTAP are aggregated to nine regions: Mozambique, 
Namibia, Botswana and South Africa have their own region, Lesotho and 
Swaziland cannot be separated. For perspectives on the regional integration, 
the other SADC countries get another region (the Seychelles cannot be 
included here, as they have no own region in GTAP), and so does the rest of 
Africa. Furthermore, the EU is one region. All other countries are aggregated 
to the “Rest of the World”. 
 
                                                                                                                                
GTAP to make a good prediction for the affected countries. However, he also showed that GTAP 
tends to underpredict the changes in his case. 
20
 More details on the aggregation can be found in the appendix 7.3. 
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In the factor aggregation, different forms of labour and other primary 
factors have to be aggregated. For this simulation, the aggregated factors are 
skilled labour, unskilled labour, land, natural resources and capital. 
During the aggregation, the mobility of these factors is also determined: 
When wages and rent change across industries, factor mobility describes the 
ease with which factors move across industries (Burfisher 2011). Some CGE 
model give the option for factor movement across countries (ibid.) however in 
GTAP the total amount of factor endowment is fixed for each country. The 
elasticity of transformation ETRAE shows the responsiveness of factors to 
changes in relative returns from close to zero (fixed allocation) to minus 
infinity (perfectly mobile) (Hertel et al. 2016). Transition costs, such as 
retraining and job search costs, are expected to reduce the mobility – however, 
if the change lasts long and e.g. workers can expect a lasting benefit from a 
career change, these costs become less relevant and factors can be expected to 
be mobile (Burfisher 2011). 
For the basic simulation, all labour and capital is set to be fully mobile. This 
is not very realistic for a ten-year simulation – among the unskilled labour, 
there seems to be a gap in the labour mobility between the agricultural sector 
and the other sectors (see Acar (2003) for a summary of studies on that and 
Appendix 7.3 for an explanation why agricultural labour cannot be split off 
other forms of labour). Also, skilled labour, even if it might have more job 
flexibility due to education or better information on alternative jobs, might 
have stable careers (as far as that is possible when their branch is affected by 
the EPA) or a high degree of specialisation, which might make then reluctant 
to leave their job (Burton and Parker 1969). Since the mobility of the factors 
have a strong effect of the sectoral reallocation, the factor mobility elasticities 
are subject to changes in the simulation variations. 
 
In the sector aggregation, agricultural (Meat&Livestock, Grains&Crops) 
and other food related commodities (Food Processing, Fishing) are left rather 
disaggregated, just as well as important branches of the industry (Heavy 
Manufacturing, Light Manufacturing, Textiles) and other sectors important to 
the regions (Extraction). This happens at the cost of two strongly aggregated 
sectors reflecting services (plus the construction sector, which is merged in 
there). 
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4.1 Basic simulation and variations 
 
Basic 
simulation 
Tariffs and agricultural export subsidies are shocked 
(negative tariffs are set to zero), 
Factors are mobile and fully employed 
Armington elasticities are increased by 20%. 
Solution found with Gragg’s method (as by default). 
Variation 1a Unlike in the basic simulation, there is labour unemployment 
Variation 
1b 
Unlike in the basic simulation, the factors labour and capital 
are more sluggish (elasticity of factor transformation of -1) 
Variation 1c Both changes of Variation 1a and 1b are applied 
simultaneously. 
Variation 2 Unlike in the basic simulation, state revenues are fixed, 
output taxes are endogenously 
 
In the basic simulation (BASIC), the tariff changes of the SADC EPA are 
implemented as shocks, without changing anything on the GTAP framework 
(by adapting closures, etc.). The only adaptation is an adaptation of the 
Armington elasticities, as Gehlhar finds that the default trade elasticities in the 
GTAP model are “too small for a 10-year simulation” (1998, p. 358), and that 
the results of his backcast analysis could be improved by increasing these 
parameters by 20% before implementing any shocks (this is the same for the 
variations). Labour and capital are assumed to be perfectly mobile across the 
sectors of one country (although the splitting of skilled labour and unskilled 
labour prevents shifts between these groups), while land has by default an 
elasticity of transformation of -1 and natural resources one of -0.001 (van 
Banse et al. 2013).
21
 
 
In the first variation of the model (VAR1a-c), the conditions of the factor 
market are varied. Since African countries typically show excess supply of 
unskilled labour, which can be drawn on by industries in the event of increased 
production, GTAP’s assumption of full employment is inappropriate for these 
countries (McDonald, Walmsley 2003). For this reason, it is favourable to fix 
the real wage rate exogenously and endogenize the supply of labour (in these 
                                                        
21
 This allows to model complex land use decisions in a simplified way: Even if land owners 
can to some extent shift from low-rent to high-rent sectors, not all crops can grow in any soil and 
climate, and not all pastures are arable land (Baltzer & Kløverpris 2008). Consequently, land rents 
do often not equalize across sectors (Baltzer & Kløverpris 2008). It is easy to imagine that 
different natural resources aggregate an even wider spectrum of very different factors – forests 
used by forestry, waterbodies used by fishery, mines used by the extraction industry, etc. (Hertel, 
Tsigas & Narayanan 2012) – that are sector-specific and hence very sluggish. 
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countries and in the rest of the world). Inter alia McDonald and Walmsley 
(2003) used this alteration to analyse the impacts of the Free Trade Agreement 
between South Africa and the EU on Botswana, or in a study about the impact 
of the West African EPA on the Ivory Coast (see Kone 2008).  
In another paper, McDonald, Thierfelder and Walmsley (2014) note that the 
gains of a trade policy reform involve much greater structural reforms in 
developing countries than in developed countries. Hence the extent of factor 
reallocation may be overestimated when factors are simply assumed to be 
mobile. A low mobility could be favourable to the wages of some groups; e.g. 
the real earnings of unskilled agricultural labour are higher when there is little 
mobility between farm and non-farm sectors (Acar 2003; see also footnote 12 
for the special challenges of subsistence farmers). Immobility of factors can be 
modelled in different ways
22
; unfortunately, the standard GTAP model only 
allows a change of the elasticity of transformation. In the range from 0 
(completely sluggish) to -∞ (completely mobile), a high sluggishness of -1 is 
assumed in simulation variation 1b and 1c for skilled labour, unskilled labour 
and capital
23
.  
                                                        
22
 In the very long run, factors such as capital can be completely shifted from one economic 
sector to another, when depreciating capital in inefficient sectors is not replaced much, and the 
money is instead invested in capital accumulation in other sectors (without changing the total 
amount of capital). This mobility is however not realistic in a scenario over ten years: It seems 
natural to assume that capital such as tractors can be used in different forms or farming, while not 
being of much use in manufacturing, extraction or fishing. Consequently, some CGE models – 
such as GTAP-AGR or GLOBE – allow the user to model restricted capital mobility between 
sectors (van Banse et al. 2013). Similarly, also the labour markets can be segmented, e.g. between 
rural and urban labour (possible in MIRAGE, LINKAGE or GLOBE) or between farm and off-
farm employment (possible in GTAP-AGR). The standard GTAP model does not include this 
possibility, instead only the elasticities of transformation can be adapted. Elasticities of 
transformation can differ much for different sectors; the literature especially notices a gap of 
mobility between farm labour and non-farm labour (Acar 2003). Equally other conjectures, such 
as the training opportunities of workers, the scale of the simulation and thereby the time frame in 
which the factor reallocation can take place or the expectations of the workers how profitable a 
job change would be in the long term, might influence the elasticity of transformation in the 
labour market.  
23
 The elasticity of transformation can be recalculated out of the labour supply elasticity and 
the revenue share of the related labour with the formula εtrans = εlabour supply/(revenue share-1) (Acar 
2003). For instance, if 3,19% of the workers switch from agricultural work to other unskilled 
work when the wages in other unskilled work rises by 1% and if 6,8% of all unskilled work is 
agricultural work, then the elasticity of transformation is 3.19/(0.068-1) = -3,42. However, this 
formula assumes there is only one ‘gap’: between agricultural and non-agricultural workers – it 
does not include other parts of unskilled works (also shop workers and clerks might not be 
perfectly mobile between their jobs), nor does it answer the questions for shifts within one sector 
(how willing are farmers to switch from animal husbandry to crop farming?). In Acar 2003, 
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In VAR1a, unemployment is allowed. In VAR1b, labour and capital is 
sluggish. In VAR1c, both changes are implemented simultaneously. 
The second variation (VAR2) simulates that the Southern African countries 
compensate their decreasing tariff revenues with additional taxes. Such a 
measurement has been done in a study on EPAs in Sub-Saharan-Africa by 
Perez and Karingi (2007): the tax on private commodity consumption (for 
imported and domestic goods) is changed to be endogenous in the closure 
rules, while the rate of indirect tax revenue to national income stays fixed. 
4.2 Definition of the shocks 
The EPA agreement contains several changes in tax, mainly tariff 
eliminations, tariff changes and tariff rate quotas. Since these changes are often 
stretched over several years, allowing the local economy to slowly adapt to the 
new conditions. Ten years after the agreement is in place, most tariffs are at 
their final stage, so the analysis will be made over the equilibrium that will be 
reached then. As the goods defined in the agreement are mostly only tiny 
fractions of the aggregated goods in GTAP, the tariff changes are calculated for 
those aggregated goods via import-weighted average tariff rates.  
 
Using TASTE, a program that adapts detailed trade and tariff data to 
GTAP-related purposes, has many advantages. Pre-existing tariffs, which may 
not all be defined as ad valorem tariffs (e.g. 5% of the imported value), but be 
specific tariffs (e.g. 15€/ton) or compound tariffs (ad valorem + specific tariff) 
are included as ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) in there – so if, according to 
the agreement, a tariff stays the way it was before the agreement, the applied 
tariff is given in the ad valorem form that can be directly used in GTAP. 
New specific or mixed tariffs, as well as new tariff rate quotas, however 
first need to be recalculated into AVEs before being put into TASTE. 
Especially for TRQ there is no ‘standard solution’ (see Appendix 7.5). Other 
(mainly tariffs that are defined beyond the 8 digit level) cannot be taken into 
account at all (see Appendix 7.4) 
 
For all goods, the applied tariffs are used. While bound tariffs are the 
maximum tariff rate a country can levy on a particular product under 
commitments made at the WTO, the applied tariff is the level of tariff actually 
                                                                                                                                
elasticities of transformation within unskilled labour are calculated as -2,030 and -3,045 (based on 
assumed data over the USA). 
 30 
 
levied at the border by the country. As Bilal and Roza (2007) point out, the 
applied tariffs are often significantly lower than the bound tariffs. Hence, Perez 
and Karingi (2007) explain, using bound tariffs would overstate the impacts of 
the tariff elimination on the concerned economies. 
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5 Results and discussion 
In this chapter, the output from all simulations is given, interpreted and 
discussed. 
In a general perspective on the development of the GDP and the welfare, all 
countries of the SADC EPA group are afflicted - although all of them can 
improve their GDP loss by a tax reform.  
The tariff revenue losses of up to 25% have an effect on the total revenue 
losses. Since the GDP decreases, other tax incomes do not naturally even that 
out - but an increase in output taxes can balance the state budget (this option 
will be discussed in more detail later) 
The current account does not suffer strongly from the agreement (changes 
are under 2%), but there is some trade deflection: The imports from the EU 
strongly increase and have a negative effect on several other sources of 
imports, the exports to the EU and some other areas increase. The trade balance 
to the EU is strongly impaired, and so are the terms of trade of the African 
partners.  
The countries of the SADC EPA group can expand their regional exports, 
but the regional imports are strongly decreasing. In total, the regional trade 
(measured with the intra-regional trade intensity index) decreases. 
Agriculture and industry are especially challenged in Mozambique, which 
will be shown in the decreasing contribution to the total value added, a stronger 
orientation towards export markets and employment losses (while wages only 
change moderately and have to be seen in the context of price developments 
and the degree of self-subsistence). 
Another result that can be drawn from the output is that even if the relative 
changes are often not very strong, especially Mozambique sees several 
negative effects at the same time. 
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5.1 General results24 
 
In all areas, the biggest contribution to the GDP came from the 
consumption (Table 20). This is affected the hardest in Mozambique (-0.4% in 
the basic simulation), so it is not surprising that Mozambique experiences the 
biggest GDP losses throughout all simulations ( Table 21, Table 1).  
 
GDP 
basic 
simulation VAR1a VAR1b VAR1c VAR2 
EU 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 
Mozambique -0,40% -0,38% -0,80% -0,81% -0,04% 
South Africa -0,04% -0,05% -0,05% -0,08% 0,01% 
Namibia -0,02% -0,01% -0,19% -0,19% -0,01% 
Botswana -0,03% -0,03% -0,06% -0,09% -0,02% 
Lesotho&Swaziland -0,03% -0,04% -0,11% -0,14% -0,04% 
Table 1: The changes of the GDP compared for the different simulation variations (own 
calculation from GTAP output, GDPEXP) 
   
Mozambique can, however, strongly reduce these GDP losses by 
introducing a tax that evens out state revenues (VAR2). Not only does this 
reduce the losses in government expenditure, but it also strongly reduces the 
losses in consumption (both basic simulation: -0.39%, VAR2: 0.01%), and 
even alleviates the losses that Mozambique experiences in its trade balance 
(basic simulation: trade deficit widens by 0.73%, VAR2: trade deficit only 
widens by 0.21%). The tax reform causes similar effects on government 
expenditures, consumption and net exports in the other African partner 
countries (although the numbers are less impressive there), which improves the 
changes in the GDP for all African partner countries. 
Interesting for a first overview are also the welfare changes: GTAP 
calculates high losses for Mozambique and South Africa (Table 2). As they are 
calculated in terms of equivalent variation, they can be interpreted like money 
losses. To get some perspective for these gains and losses in relation to the size 
of the economies, Table 22 shows all welfare changes are percentage changes 
of the initial GDP. Again, Mozambique clearly shows the highest losses.
25
  
                                                        
24
 The other figures and tables to this chapter can be found in Appendix 7.8 
25
 These welfare losses are mainly driven by losses in commodity terms of trade and 
investment-savings terms of trade, and to smaller extents also allocative efficiency effects. The 
losses in investment-savings terms of trade are based on the ratio between the price domestically 
produced capital investment goods and the ‘price of savings’ (a GTAP internal, theoretical 
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Welfare 
basic 
simulation VAR1a VAR1b VAR1c VAR2 
EU 234,4 234,5 259,2 300,7 302,6 
Mozambique -16,2 -13,1 -30,4 -41,7 -34,1 
South Africa -51,0 -76,8 -92,3 -125,2 -107,7 
Namibia 0,7 1,6 0,2 1,4 -0,4 
Botswana 1,1 0,0 -0,3 -3,7 0,1 
Lesotho&Swaziland 0,4 -0,1 0,7 -1,3 0,6 
Table 2: The changes of the welfare compared for the different simulation variations (own 
calculation from GTAP output, WELFARE) 
  
basic 
simulation VAR1a VAR1b VAR1c VAR2 
total welfare 169 146 137 130 161 
tariff revenue gains 
in the EU 262 261 212 280 280 
total welfare 
SA+BLMNS -65 -88 -122 -171 -142 
Table 3: Total welfare effects, tariff revenue gains in the EU and total welfare effects in the 
SADC EPA group. 
 
In the context of the intended development cooperation, it is worth noting 
that the total welfare losses occurring in the African partner states are smaller 
than the total welfare gains of the EU; which makes it theoretically possible 
that the development cooperation named in the agreement could archive 
compensation between the winners and losers of the agreement (Table 3). Of 
course, this becomes more complicated if the winners are private and have no 
political will to support the African partner countries. But as the same table 
shows, even when the gains in state revenues in the EU are compared with the 
total welfare losses in the SADC EPA group, the EU’s state revenues are 
bigger – which theoretically allows the EU to use a part of their state revenue 
                                                                                                                                
number) (Burfisher 2011). It reflects the idea that investment sales are also a source of income to 
a country, and that a higher price would generate a higher income (Keck & Piermartini 2007). 
This is criticized by Keck and Piermartini (2007), as it would not well represent the true benefits 
of savings and investment. Furthermore, in more current versions of GTAP, this welfare 
component has been “has been considerably muted in the current version of the GTAP model by 
permitting psave(r) to vary by region. In particular, psave(r) moves closely with pcgds(r) in order 
to capture the fact that the majority of savings is invested domestically.” (Huff & Hertel 2000, p. 
17). The allocative efficiency effects are the excess burden of each tax. The commodity terms of 
trade effects will be closer looked when the current account in analysed. More information on the 
welfare decomposition can be found in Huff & Hertel (2000). 
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gains out of the EPA to alleviate the losses of the SADC EPA countries. Bilal 
& Roza (2007) however argue that there might be little political will for a one-
for-one compensation, since this kind of compensation might give higher 
transfers to bigger, more developed countries (such as South Africa here) than 
to the underdeveloped countries. 
5.2 Results for the areas of concern 
2.4.1 A declining state budget
26
 
 A former study estimated that the SADC EPA group will lose 19.4% of 
their customs revenue, which is 5.0% of their total public revenue, thereby 
being slightly under the average of the ACP groups (McKay 1998, see Bilal 
and Roza 2007, p. 10). The simulation in this thesis does not deviate from this 
too much: Especially Mozambique and Namibia can experience high tariff 
revenue losses (Table 4, on the importance of tariffs, see   Table 25, Figure 14). 
The total state revenues are especially affected in Mozambique and Botswana, 
if not evened out by a revenue-balancing tax as in Var2 (Table 4). As will be 
seen in the following chapters, such a tax increase does not cause major 
disruptions to the other regarded areas (apart from the value added of the 
sectors Fish, Light Manufacturing and Textiles in Mozambique and the real 
wages in Table 15, Table 16) and even has some positive effects on the GDP or 
current account losses. 
revenue 
changes EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
basic 
simulation 0,01% -5,70% -0,39% -0,47% -3,37% -0,46% 
VAR1a 0,01% -5,68% -0,40% -0,47% -3,37% -0,47% 
VAR1b 0,00% -5,74% -0,39% -0,47% -3,38% -0,46% 
VAR1c 0,00% -5,74% -0,38% -0,47% -3,38% -0,46% 
VAR2 0,01% 0,15% 0,04% 0,02% 0,03% 0,01% 
Table 4: Calculation of the total revenue changes – same calculation as in  Table 25, but 
comparing the outcomes of all simulations. Unsurprisingly, when the revenues ratio to the 
GDP is fixed exogenously (as in VAR2), the total revenue losses differ much from the other 
scenarios. 
It should be noted that these numbers cannot be taken literally because of 
the revenue sharing formula of the SACU countries (as mentioned in footnote 
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 More figures and tables to this chapter can be found in Appendix 7.9 
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11 and further explained in chapter 5.3). For Mozambique, as not being part of 
the SACU, the losses are however not alleviated by that. 
2.4.2 A deterioration for the current account
27
 
The trade balance towards the EU deteriorates for all African partners. 
South Africa, which again already had a trade deficit with the EU before the 
EPA, widens this deficit by around 7%. Namibia and Lesotho&Swaziland lose 
some of their surplus (in the strongest cases over 9% resp. over 5%), Botswana 
gets off comparably lightly with a loss of maximum 1.5%. The most extreme 
case is Mozambique, which loses up to 38% of their trade surplus towards the 
EU (Table 5). All losses in the trade balance with the EU to the Southern 
African countries equate to gains on the side of the European Union: The 
European Union already had a strong trade surplus towards the SADC EPA 
group, which is expands by 25.3% with the EPA at the costs of the Southern 
African producers. 
 
trade balance 
with the EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
basic 
simulation -38,48% 7,70% -9,18% -1,46% -5,49% 
VAR1a -26,54% 5,58% -1,65% -0,92% -2,22% 
VAR1b -26,87% 5,70% -1,65% -0,93% -2,27% 
VAR1c -26,86% 5,71% -1,65% -0,93% -2,27% 
VAR2 -26,38% 5,53% -1,62% -0,91% -2,21% 
Table 5: Changes in the trade balance towards the EU. Note that South Africa had a 
trade deficit before, so the “increase” shown here is in fact a widening of the deficit 
(therefore also coloured red, although positive). 
 
It is possible to give a closer look to the sectors that experience the biggest 
losses in their trade balance towards the EU (Table 26). Clearly heavy and light 
manufacturing and textiles are big losers of the EPA in almost all African 
partner countries. 
GTAP also calculates a total current account
28
 under the standard closure
29
, 
where the losses appear more moderate. Mozambique and South Africa, which 
                                                        
27
 More figures and tables to this chapter can be found in Appendix 7.10 
28
 The current account in GTAP only consists of the balance of trade, since there are no 
observations on international transfer receipts (Hertel &Tsigas 1997) 
29
 As Burfisher (2011) notes, a rise imports (or decrease in exports) also increases the demand 
for the foreign currency (respectively, decreases the demand for the current currency). The 
national currency would thereby depreciate, making imports less attractive to the local consumers 
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already had a negative trade balance before the EPA, widen this deficit by 
about 0,7% respectively over 1% (Figure 15,  Table 6). The other countries 
lose some of their trade surplus, the strongest Namibia (-0,17%). All countries 
can mitigate this by introducing a revenue-balancing tax ( Table 6).  
 
current 
account 
changes EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
basic 
simulatio
n 0,06% 0,73% 1,07% -0,17% -0,12% -0,13% 
VAR1a 0,06% 0,74% 1,02% -0,17% -0,12% -0,13% 
VAR1b 0,03% 0,70% 1,21% -0,17% -0,10% -0,15% 
VAR1c 0,03% 0,70% 1,22% -0,17% -0,10% -0,14% 
VAR2 0,06% 0,17% 0,81% -0,11% -0,06% -0,10% 
 Table 6: Changes in the current account of the countries. Note again that the EU, 
Mozambique and South Africa had a trade deficit before, so the “increase” shown here is in 
fact a widening of the deficit (own calculation from GTAP output, note also that GTAP only 
includes the trade balance in the current account) 
But as made clear before, not only the absolute amount of imports and 
exports matter, also the purchasing power of a countries exports, which is 
measured with the terms of trade – i.e., the ratio of export prices and import 
prices (Burfisher 2011). Because there are several export and import goods, 
global CGE models measure the ratio of export prices and import prices with 
the help of a price index (Burfisher 2011).
30
 In the welfare composition in 
GTAP the terms of trade are a major (negative) contributor for the African 
countries, hitting (in absolute terms) South Africa and Mozambique the 
strongest (Table 7). Relative to their economic size, Mozambique is affected 
the most from this (Table 27). 
 
                                                                                                                                
and exports of the country more attractive to the rest of the world. Therefore, modelers sometimes 
assume that with a flexible exchange rate, the current account balance stays fixed. This can also 
be done in GTAP by adapting the closures. However, this ignores international capital mobility 
(Gilbert 2004), and instead the standard closure will be used here.  
30
 Actually, economically small countries with no impact on the world market prices face fixed 
import- and export prices independently of their trade behaviour and do hence not experience 
terms of trade effects (Burfisher 2011). However, in CGE models with Armington elasticities, the 
commodities from different countries are imperfect substitutes, which means that each country 
has a monopoly on its very own local products (ibid.). Thereby, in CGE models even small 
countries can experience terms of trade effects, if other countries have a low substitution elasticity 
(i.e. are attached enough to the countries’ exports). 
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terms of trade effects basic simulation VAR1a VAR1b VAR1c VAR2 
EU 140,99 141,15 130,36 130,44 141,93 
Mozambique -6,97 -7,21 -6,00 -6,02 -7,60 
South Africa -22,02 -21,47 -18,29 -18,15 -23,16 
Namibia -0,82 -0,85 -0,80 -0,82 -0,93 
Botswana -0,37 -0,32 -0,39 -0,43 -0,49 
Lesotho&Swaziland -0,48 -0,47 -0,45 -0,44 -0,51 
Table 7: Changes in the total terms of trade effect in the different simulation variations.. 
Since the data is taken from GTAP’s calculation of the welfare in equivalent variation, these 
values can be interpreted like money values (data from the GTAP simulation) 
2.4.3 Diminishing regional trade
31
 
The imports and exports with the EU increase (Figure 18), while several 
regional trade streams are decreasing (Table 8).  
 
  SADC EPA plus SADC plus RoA 
basic 
simulation -2,17% -0,59% -0,22% 
VAR1a -2,16% -0,59% -0,22% 
VAR1b -2,21% -0,59% -0,22% 
VAR1c -2,21% -0,59% -0,22% 
VAR2 -2,21% -0,59% -0,22% 
Table 8: Changes in regional trade within the SADC EPA group, within the SADC and 
within Africa (own calculation based in GTAP output, VIWS. The last two groups are net of 
the previous named groups) 
 
The absolute losses in regional exports and imports are smaller than the 
gains in EU exports and imports (Figure 19). This means, the streams of 
commerce have not simply been deflected in a zero-sum game. Apparently, the 
consumers are not only purchasing their normal amounts of imports from a 
different source, but are benefiting enough from prises and access to preferred 
goods that they decide to purchase more imports than before. 
Which regional trade streams are really negatively affected by the 
additional imports? When imports and exports are summed up, one can see that 
the trade within the SADC EPA, within the SADC and within Africa all 
decrease throughout all simulations (Table 8). But when exports and imports 
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 More figures and tables to this chapter can be found in Appendix 7.11 
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are viewed independently, the picture becomes patchier: For the trade with the 
rest of the SADC and the trade with the rest of Africa, regional exports are 
increasing, while regional imports are decreasing (Table 9). For the trade 
within the SADC EPA group, all trade (except for Mozambique’s exports and 
South Africa’s imports) is decreasing. 
  South Africa Botswana Mozambique Namibia 
Lesotho& 
Swaziland 
  M X M X M X M X M X 
regional 
(REC) 5,3 -131,7 -6,5 -0,8 -121,6 5,2 -4,6 -0,7 -1,8 -1,2 
regional 
(SADC) -8,9 13,1 -1,0 0,1 -8,8 1,6 -1,9 0,4 -0,2 0,2 
regional 
(RoA) -18,9 11,4 -0,2 0,1 -2,3 0,2 -0,1 0,1 -0,1 0,3 
EU 934,3 323,0 33,4 0,9 361,2 28,8 28,6 3,1 14,2 0,8 
rest of 
the world -556,6 101,2 -21,0 1,5 -176,5 6,9 -14,3 2,2 -9,0 1,8 
Table 9: Comparison of trade changes(M=imports, X=exports) in absolute numbers. 
Note that the groups “regional (SADC EPA)” and “regional (RoA)” are net of other 
groups, i.e. the first green column shows how much less is imported from SADC countries 
that are not already depicted in the Regional Group that concluded the EPA (Data from the 
GTAP database, VIWS) 
Through the ‘blackbox’ of the CGE, it is hard to understand all incentives 
behind consumption shifts, but a calculation on correlations could shed some 
light upon the issue. For this, the correlation coefficient between the absolute 
changes in EU imports and the absolute changes in imports, exports and value 
added are calculated (Table 30). The results of this show ambiguous tendencies 
concerning the correlation between the value added and the imports from the 
EU. If only imports and exports outside the regional group are regarded, there 
is a tendency that high EU imports correlate with lower imports from other 
trade partners (for six out of ten sectors) and higher exports to other trade 
partners (seven out of ten sectors). The correlation of imports and exports 
within the regional group with EU imports deviates from these tendencies – 
both imports and exports between SADC EPA countries are rather negatively 
correlated with EU imports. 
 
How could these values be interpreted? 
One possible explanation is that regional imports are crowded out by the 
cheap new EU imports, especially in the food or industry related sectors. 
Regional exports on the other hand seem to benefit more the higher the EU 
imports are, unless they are directed at other SADC EPA countries. So why is 
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there a difference for regional exports, depending on whether they stay within 
the SADC EPA group or are exported outside of it? 
EU imports within the SADC EPA group have two effects: They bring a 
higher amount of final goods on the market, thereby lowering the consumer 
prices, and they bring a higher amount of intermediate inputs, lowering the 
production costs. The local producers can benefit from the additional 
intermediate inputs and may be able to produce cheaper, which is especially 
beneficial on markets where they do not compete with the new consumer 
prices and the new production costs. That means, they have better chances 
exporting to countries that do not have the same trade agreement with the EU. 
So while exports to other SADC EPA countries do not increase much, exports 
to other SADC countries and other African countries can thrive. As long as 
other markets are assumed to have no EPA agreement with the EU (which 
some have, but which is not simulated), they face a less strong price 
competition there
32
. Consequently, the exports to countries outside the SADC 
EPA can benefit from the EU imports, while the exports within the regional 
group, not so much.  
 
In total, even in regional exports can increase, the regional trade suffers 
from the trade agreement: the regional trade intensity decreases on different 
levels of ‘regionality’ in all simulation variations (Table 29). The situation on 
the regional markets however strongly differs from sector to sector – while the 
EU imports seem to have a positive effect on regional exports of industrial 
commodities, they seem to harm the abilities to export grains and crops
33
. This 
leads to the next step: analysing the effects for potentially vulnerable sectors. 
2.4.4 A hazard to agriculture and industry
34
 
 The EPA causes some sectors to decrease, others can gain from it. Table 10 
shows that there is no strong pattern of certain sectors always being among the 
losers: rather, most sectors change by less than ±0,5%. However, in 
Mozambique there are some noticeable declines in several sectors.  
 
                                                        
32
 This means that under more realistic circumstances, where also the other EPAs are 
modelled, the abilities of the SADC EPA counties to export would shrink and the regional trade 
would be harmed more than is seen here. 
33
 A positive correlation coefficient doesn’t state that regional exports would increase, it just 
states that higher EU imports correlate with higher exports OR lower losses.  
34
 The figures and tables for to this chapter – which are unfortunately mostly too large to add 
them in the text – can be found in Appendix 7.12 
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  EU Mozambique South Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho& 
Swaziland 
Grains&Crops -0,06% -0,11% 1,95% 0,005% 0,04% 0,00% 
Meat&Livestock 0,00% -1,51% 0,16% 0,10% 0,00% 0,01% 
Processed Food 0,01% -0,23% -0,03% 0,00% -0,01% 0,00% 
Fish -0,02% -0,57% 1,88% -0,01% 0,08% 0,04% 
Extraction -0,01% 0,23% 0,06% 0,03% 0,01% 0,02% 
Textiles 0,00% -0,82% -0,02% -0,13% 0,11% 0,04% 
Light 
Manufacturing 0,01% -0,90% -0,04% -0,15% -0,12% -0,40% 
Heavy 
Manufacturing 0,01% 0,56% -0,11% 0,02% -0,19% -0,13% 
TrnsCmUtiCns 0,01% 0,30% 0,01% 0,02% 0,04% -0,02% 
Other Services 0,00% -0,09% -0,02% 0,01% 0,00% 0,01% 
Table 10: Changes in the value added of all sectors in all countries in the basic 
simulation (calculated from the GTAP output, VFM) 
The changes can be split into two components: on one hand, the value 
added of sectors will change if the country’s production experiences positive or 
negative growth. On the other hand, the value added will decrease if a sector is 
particularly uncompetitive under the EPA.  
𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 ∗ VA  
→ ln (𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟) = ln (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝐴𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟) + ln (VA)   
 
With the SADC EPA, the sectors are not so much affected by the scant total 
VA growth (0,06% in Mozambique, 0,01% in South Africa and Namibia, 
0,00% in Botswana and -0,01% in Lesotho and Swaziland). Table 10  hence 
mainly shows the restructuring from less competitive to more competitive 
sectors. 
Opponents of the agreement have argued that uncompetitive farmers with 
little access to technology and the uncompetitive infant industry would suffer 
from the agreement, as they are particularly unable to adapt. Indeed cases like 
the meat and livestock sector in Mozambique confirm this worry: While 
Mozambique’s total VA grows by 0,06%, this growth is overcompensated by 
the sector’s decreasing share of the total VA (-1,57%). Table 10 shows that 
these trends appear in several countries, but that no country experiences as 
strong and often negative shifts as Mozambique. While the simulation 
variations show similar results, the existence of a tax reform has a notable 
impact on the sectors’ value added changes (Table 31, Table 32). Again, 
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Mozambique could prefer to not raise such a tax due to the strong effects on 
Fish, Textiles and Light Manufacturing. 
 
  EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho&
Swaziland 
Grains&Crops -0,04% -0,23% 0,80% -0,01% 0,01% -0,02% 
Meat&Livestock 0,00% -1,63% -0,04% 0,05% -0,01% 0,00% 
Processed Food 0,00% -0,60% -0,04% -0,03% -0,05% -0,01% 
Fish 0,00% -0,52% 0,31% -0,17% -0,03% -0,13% 
Extraction 0,00% -0,23% -0,07% -0,10% -0,08% -0,03% 
Textiles 0,00% -1,14% -0,07% -0,17% -0,05% -0,10% 
Light 
Manufacturing 0,00% -1,45% -0,13% -0,24% -0,23% -0,47% 
Heavy 
Manufacturing 0,01% -0,05% -0,22% -0,10% -0,36% -0,20% 
TrnsCmUtiCns 0,00% -0,53% -0,06% -0,05% -0,02% -0,07% 
Other Services 0,00% -0,41% -0,05% -0,02% -0,03% -0,02% 
Total 0,00% -0,42% -0,07% -0,05% -0,03% -0,06% 
Table 11: changes in domestic purchases of domestically produced goods (calculated from 
the GTAP output, VDFM, VDGM, VDPM). The simulation variations show similar trends. 
  EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho&
Swaziland 
Grains&Crops -0,06% 0,27% 4,79% -0,11% -0,02% -0,01% 
Meat&Livestock 0,01% 1,00% -0,63% 0,13% 0,00% -0,35% 
Processed Food 0,00% 0,36% -0,10% -0,06% 0,10% 0,03% 
Fish -0,02% 0,75% 2,12% 0,04% 0,10% 0,04% 
Extraction -0,01% 0,11% 0,04% 0,12% 0,00% 0,03% 
Textiles 0,00% 1,07% 0,01% 0,02% 0,28% 0,19% 
Light 
Manufacturing 0,01% 1,12% 0,09% 0,07% 0,19% -0,20% 
Heavy 
Manufacturing 0,02% 1,52% 0,13% 0,16% 0,02% 0,04% 
TrnsCmUtiCns -0,01% 0,64% 0,09% 0,05% 0,10% 0,11% 
Other Services -0,01% 0,29% 0,07% 0,00% 0,04% 0,07% 
Total 0,01% 0,76% 0,25% 0,09% 0,03% 0,06% 
Table 12: changes in non-margin exports of domestically produced goods (calculated 
from the GTAP output, VXMD). The simulation variations show similar trends. 
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Another aspect of vulnerability can be seen when the produced goods are 
split into those that go into the domestic consumption (Table 11) and those that 
go into exports (Table 12): While domestic purchases decrease almost 
everywhere and in all sectors, the export oriented production can expect gains 
almost everywhere and in all sectors
35
. For smallholders, this is bad news: As 
they lack the resources to switch to cash crops and find it harder to comply 
with international standards (see footnote 12), their produce is mostly directed 
at local markets, where they need to cope with a stronger competition. 
This trend of lowered domestic consumption and increasing exports can 
also, and even stronger, be seen in the industry. Already during the analysis of 
the current account, it was shown that heavy and light manufacturing and the 
textiles sectors are strongly losing in their trade balance with the EU (Table 
26). Especially in textiles countries are doubling (South Africa), tripling 
(Botswana) or quintupling (Mozambique) their trade deficits with the EU or 
even create a trade deficit where there had been a surplus before (Namibia, and 
in extreme forms Lesotho&Swaziland). Even if these sectors are not led by 
individuals or families with extremely limited resources (as the smallholders), 
this means a stronger competition with imported commodities on the local 
markets and a stronger need to comply with the standards of the destination 
countries. 
 
For the large number of smallholders, who are not easily able to change 
their profession, it is also interesting to take a special look at VAR1b and 
VAR1c, with their assumption of high labour and capital sluggishness. Table 
31 shows that the factor sluggishness alone (VAR1b) does not enhance any 
losses, only in combination with unemployment some slight increases can be 
seen (especially in Mozambique). 
 
The shift of the farmers into other sectors is also influenced by land prices: 
Mozambique, and to smaller extents Botswana and Namibia, experience 
cheaper rents (Figure 20). This might be a sign that more farmers want to give 
up on farming (supplying their land) than there is demand for this land by 
remaining farmers. These cheap prices affect the opportunity costs of those 
farmers who want to leave their sector (they are getting less money for the land 
they have to sell), but at the same time the remaining farmers could benefits 
from the relatively cheaper land, that they can acquire additionally (which 
possibly allows them to improve their situation through scale effects, which are 
                                                        
35
 Keck and Piermartini (2007) partly interpret the increase of export from farming and food 
processing as trade diversion on the cost of other developing countries, notably Latin American 
ones. 
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not taken into account in GTAP). South Africa, on the contrary, with its raise 
in value added in the farming sector (which also means a higher contribution of 
this sector to the total value added), experience a strong increase in land rents, 
potentially making it harder for smallholders to acquire additional land and to 
benefit as much of the recovery of their sector. 
 
As to wages, an analysis of farmers’ or industrial workers’ wages is not 
independently possible (see Appendix 7.3 for details). However, unskilled 
labour can be analysed cross-sectorally:  
 
unskilled labour EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
basic simulation 0,00% 0,02% 0,00% 0,01% -0,01% -0,01% 
VAR1b 0,00% -0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% -0,01% 
VAR2 0,00% -0,02% 0,00% 0,01% -0,02% -0,01% 
Table 13: Wage changes for unskilled labour in all simulations (GTAP output, pm). Note 
that the wage was fixed exogenously in VAR1a and VAR1c, so the change is 0% there.  
skilled labour EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
basic simulation 0,01% 0,06% -0,01% 0,01% 0,00% -0,01% 
VAR1b 0,00% 0,03% -0,01% 0,02% 0,01% 0,00% 
VAR2 0,01% 0,07% -0,01% 0,01% -0,01% -0,01% 
Table 14: Same as above, but for skilled labour 
These are the absolute wage changes – if the real wage changes are 
regarded, there are no negative changes as long as there is no tax reform (Table 
15, Table 16). This is because the additional imports increase the supply of 
many goods, lowering the price level for the average consumer basket.  
 
  EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
basic 
simulation 0,00% 0,26% 0,02% 0,03% 0,02% 0,03% 
VAR1a 0,00% 0,25% 0,02% 0,02% 0,03% 0,04% 
VAR1b 0,00% 0,27% 0,03% 0,03% 0,03% 0,03% 
VAR1c 0,00% 0,28% 0,02% 0,02% 0,02% 0,03% 
VAR2 0,00% -0,43% -0,07% -0,03% -0,06% -0,02% 
Table 15: Real wage changes for unskilled labour in all simulations (GTAP output, 
pfactreal). 
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  EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
basic 
simulation 0,00% 0,30% 0,01% 0,04% 0,03% 0,03% 
VAR1a 0,00% 0,25% 0,02% 0,02% 0,03% 0,04% 
VAR1b 0,00% 0,31% 0,01% 0,04% 0,03% 0,03% 
VAR1c 0,00% 0,28% 0,02% 0,02% 0,02% 0,03% 
VAR2 0,00% -0,35% -0,08% -0,03% -0,05% -0,02% 
Table 16: Same as above, for skilled labour 
 
Especially Mozambican consumers can benefit from the lower price level 
(Table 15, Table 16). Consequently, especially for Mozambique, the concern 
about self-sustaining farmers is relevant: If these farmers do not show the 
average consumption behaviour of unskilled workers, they might benefit much 
less from the lowered prices, while possibly still facing income losses similar 
to the lowered wages. 
If we instead assume that the market equilibrium is reached with 
employment changes (VAR1a and VAR1c), due to the way this is modelled in 
the GTAP closures, wages are exogenously fixed. For the skilled labour, the 
losses and gains in the sectors are identical, but since there is a different 
composition of skilled and unskilled workers in the sectors, skilled workers 
have a differing number of total employment changes. All countries but 
Namibia see employment losses, while skilled workers are worse off than 
unskilled workers in all countries but South Africa (Table 33). Mozambique 
does not only suffer from the highest total employment losses for skilled  and 
unskilled labour (Table 33), but also has some strongly affected sectors, such 
as Meat&Lifestock (-1,43% in Var1a, Table 34, -0,92 in Var1c, Table 35), and 
to a lesser extend textiles and light manufacturing (-0,77% and -0,86% in 
Var1a, Table 35, -0,43% and -45% in Var1c, Table 35). The South African 
Gains&Crops sector, on the other hand, sees an upsurge (+1,61% in Var1a, 
Table 34, +0,86% in Var1c, Table 35). The transition can cause costs of 
dislocation, occupational retraining and unemployment. These costs also 
depend on the sectors on which workers can fall back – for example, the 
employment gain in the Mozambican heavy manufacturing sector can give job-
seeking workers from the light manufacturing sector a chance to find new 
employment that is likely to involve less transition costs than a change into the 
service or agricultural sector. 
While several of the seen changes have a magnitude of only a few percent, 
in cases like Mozambique – where especially Meat&Lifestock, Light 
Manufacturing and Textiles face a harder competition on the local markets, 
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smallholders have limited possibilities to make use of the improved export 
markets, and wages and employments are under pressure – problems 
accumulate. Considering their widening trade deficit towards the EU and their 
decreasing state revenues – Mozambique may find itself in a predicament: If 
they want to improve the structural problems of smallholders with an improved 
access to credits and other resources and invest in their infrastructure, they lack 
the money due to the loss in tariff revenues. The government can balance this 
over the value added tax, but thereby the consumers face higher rather than 
lower prices through the EPA. 
5.3 Possible adaptations to increase the accuracy 
 
The list of possible further adaptations and model variations to adapt the 
model closer to reality has no limit.  
Keck and Piermartini recommend “not to evaluate an FTA in isolation 
when participating countries are involved in similar efforts with other partners” 
(2007, p. 112). This is clearly true for the SADC EPA: By not being the only 
group of less developed countries with a new preferential status to the EU, but 
one of many EPA groups, the Southern African states have a less preferential 
role (although producers can benefit from intermediate inputs imported from 
the EU, it is likely that they cannot use that as well on export markets if the 
destination countries also have an EPA, see footnote 32). On the other hand, 
they can also gain from the rules of origin, which depend on the other EPAs 
(products from other EPA signatories can be treated like own wholly obtained 
goods). And of course, the EU is involved in several other FTA negotiations, 
and so are some of the Southern African states (as e.g. the Tripartite Free Trade 
Area). 
Additionally, authors like Ramdoo (2014) or Mayn (2008) make clear that 
there are non-tariff barriers that de facto limit the access to the EU market. 
Standards, Inspections and Controls on products in more and less developed 
countries may differ, even if the WTO sets some requirements to avoid 
protectionist usage of standards, as with the SPS or the TBT agreement
36
. It 
might be possible to recalculate differences in standards and procedures into 
tariff equivalents (Cadot et al. (2007) give a methodology for this), which 
                                                        
36
 according to the SPS agreement sanitary and phytosanitary measures should be based on 
scientific analysis rather than protectionist incentives. Similarly, the TBT agreement requires 
technical standards are not discriminatory (see WTO 1998 and WTO 2014 for further 
information). 
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could theoretically allow to include non-tariff measurements into the GTAP 
framework – however, to do this would require an analysis by itself. 
Gehlhar (1997) shows in his analysis on the Pacific Rim, that the export 
share changes of East Asia are predicted significantly better if labour and 
human capital is separated and capital and human capital are set to be 
complementary inputs.  
McDonald & Walmsley (2003) note that GTAP does not depict the tariff 
revenue changes right, as all tariff revenues within SACU are collected by 
South Africa and then distributed among the member states according to a 
revenue sharing formula. They changed the closure rules to adapt for this, 
however taking over such an approach would have strongly affected the model 
(e.g. by fixing the trade balances of all but one country). A manual 
recalculation on the other hand appears to be of a too wide scope for this thesis 
(see Flatters, Stern 2005 for details on the calculation). 
McDonald and Walmsley (2003) note that Botswana’s diamond exports are 
de facto fixed by the De Beers cartel in prices and quantity, its beef exports are 
influenced by an agreement with the EU and its crop production is naturally 
limited in expansion due to climatic circumstances, and include such 
assumptions in their model.  
 
However tempting it might be to make a more accurate and thorough 
analysis, this thesis had to stick to a more basic analysis due to the limits in 
time, page number and expertise of the author. 
 
Beyond that, there are variations that are not too extensive and were 
seriously considered as further model variations. E.g. the variation by Keck 
and Piermartini, who note that “many of the bilateral trade flows in the 
database, especially between SADC countries, are practically zero. Given the 
way the GTAP model is set up, an absence of current trade cannot result in any 
trade flows after liberalisation has taken place” (2007, p. 107). This can be 
prevented by increasing all these imports with a small number and might have 
brought different results especially for the regional trade. Such a variation was 
not included, as more than five simulations were considered confusing to keep 
track of for the reader. 
Two more variations (in which Mozambique’s tariffs were shocked over the 
‘target rate’ command instead of ‘%change power shocks’, respectively in 
which the labour aggregation did not only separate skilled and unskilled 
labour, but also agricultural labour) were tried out without bringing the hoped 
improvements and were hence given up again very fast (details on this can be 
found in Appendix 7.4 and 7.3).  
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6 Conclusion 
Considering that the tariffs were very small initially, the tariff reduction 
brings some surprisingly negative effects. 
 
The argument that the economic growth promoted by the EPA would even 
out revenue losses, could be refuted. According to the results of the simulation, 
not only will the tariff revenues decrease: Instead of growth the African 
partners will also experience a decline of the GDP. Mozambique incurs the 
highest losses both in tariff revenues (over 16%) and total state revenues (over 
5%). A revenue fixating tax can even out these revenue losses and cushion the 
current account and the GDP changes – however, they also have an effect on 
the sectors’ value added, especially in Mozambique – where the value added of 
the sectors Fish, Light Manufacturing and Textiles are declining much stronger 
when such a tax is in place. Additionally, such a tax raise negate the positive 
effect the EPA has on the price level. 
 
Opponents of the agreement feared that the opening of the markets would 
hardly add export opportunities for the SADC EPA group, while bringing a 
strong inflow of imports. Indeed, also in the past, a lack of market access has 
not been the bottleneck for the expansion of Southern African exports - so a 
lowering of the tariffs does not entail many new exports: The trade balance 
with the EU deteriorates strongly in all African partner countries - although the 
total current account is affected by changes under 2%. The terms of trade 
additionally decrease, i.e. the ‘worth’ of the remaining exports shrink, as their 
purchasing power decreases. 
 
Some opponents were also concerned about the regional trade, since local 
consumers may favour EU imports over regional imports. While there is trade 
deflection, there is also trade creation: Both EU imports and exports increase 
stronger than regional imports and exports decrease. The EU imports crowd 
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out regional imports, but increase exports to important trade partners outside 
the SADC EPA (such as the other SADC countries). In total, regional trade 
however decreases. 
 
Opponents of the agreement see agriculture - with its high share of 
subsistence farmers and smallholders - and the infant industries as specifically 
endangered through the opening of the markets, as they would have no chance 
to compete with these sectors from the EU market. The resulting shifts away 
from those sectors can be seen the strongest in Mozambique (except Heavy 
Manufacturing), while the changes are moderate in the other African partner 
countries and even positive for the Grains&Crops sector and the Fish sector in 
South Africa.  
Smallholders are however in a harsher position, as there is a stronger 
orientation towards exports. With their limited access to credits, fertilizers and 
other resources (especially when female) and the difficulties to comply with 
the sanitary, phytosanitary and environmental standards of the destination 
country, smallholders will probably find it difficult to get their share of the 
benefits of increasing exports. At the same time, they have to compete against 
the EU imports on their local markets and it can be shown that the domestic 
purchases of domestically produced goods decrease.  
Changing land prices bring winners and losers in the agricultural sectors, 
depending on whether a farmer wants to change his profession and give up his 
land or if he wants to expand and benefit from positive economies of scale 
(which are not considered in GTAP). 
While the nominal wages hardly changes, occurring minor losses are 
overcompensated by lowered consumers' prices for most workers - this may 
however not be the case for subsistence farmers, whose market basket might 
deviate from the average (as they base much of their food consumption on own 
production rather than market purchases, and do therefore not benefit e.g. from 
lower food prices as much).  
Job losses stay far below 1% in most sectors of the SADC EPA members 
(except for the Meat&Livestock sector in Mozambique) and the sluggishness 
in factor mobility, which could also especially affect smallholders, rather leads 
to less job losses. 
 
The industry even if they operate as firms rather than in a state of 
subsistence economy, face the same challenges of decreasing domestic 
purchases and rising exports, which require compliance with standards. Their 
real factor incomes are increasing and factor sluggishness does not seem to 
have a major effect here, either, but stronger than agriculture, the sector is 
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affected from employment changes: Especially in Mozambique and 
Lesotho&Swaziland, some unemployment of close to or over 1% has to be 
expected in sectors of the industry.  
Proponents and opponents moreover both argued with factors such as spill 
over effects or labour standards, that cannot be analysed with a CGE. 
 
Concerning the precarious situation for subsistence farmers and 
smallholders, a better tariff protection of the agricultural sector might however 
not have been the best alternative: Matthews (2010), when talking about the 
effects of the EPAs on food security, takes the unequivocal stand that these 
structural problems need to be solved rather with investments than with trade 
restrictions: 
  
 
And even Germanwatch, one detractor of the EPA, sees the necessity to 
help farmers to overcome supply-side constraints, by addressing “for instance 
transport and marketing, storage facilities, agricultural inputs, credit systems 
for smallholder farming, weak tax systems, public procurement, etc.” (Bertow 
& Schultheis 2007, p. 48).  
In the funding of those investments, the tariff revenue losses however have 
to be mentioned: Mozambique has the highest relative loss of state revenues, 
the highest relative loss in the trade balance with the EU (even if not the 
highest loss in the current account), the highest loss of employment for both 
skilled and unskilled workers, the highest loss of employment in agricultural 
sectors and the highest loss of employment in industrial sectors. Even if the 
suggested tax reform had positive effects and could even out the revenue 
losses, there might be little enthusiasm among the voters for increasing taxes 
during times of an economic drain. Instead, the state might try to compensate 
“Small-scale farmers need access to modern inputs, resources and 
technologies – such as high-quality seeds, fertilisers, feed and farming tools 
and equipment – that will allow them to boost productivity and production. 
This requires investment in agriculture, rather than trade restrictions. 
Requiring consumers to pay high prices simply to maintain an unproductive 
agriculture is not a sustainable strategy to improve food security. The 
potential of EPAs to improve food security can only be realised by a focus on 
greater agricultural investment and improved institutions.” (Matthews 2010, 
p. 26) 
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the losing sectors and support the higher amount of unemployed people with 
the help of debt, deepening the existing twin deficit. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that most concerns of the critics of the 
agreement have proven to point in the right direction. The outcomes are often 
not very dramatic, many changes are under 1%, but they exist and they can 
accumulate. Even if Mozambique is sure the most extreme example, other 
countries might face similar situations. Their endeavours to reduce public 
debts, to improve exports, substitute imports through own production, deepen 
the regional integration, support their large share of subsistence farmers and 
foster the infant industry at the same time are likely to be seriously aggravated 
by the new SADC EPA. 
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7 Appendices
37
 
7.1 The EPA negotiations 
From 2001 to 2007 the EU and the ACP countries were given time to 
negotiate the WTO-compatible EPAs. Until then they were allowed to trade by 
the terms of the Cotonou agreement, which did not meet WTO criteria – 
granted to them through a waiver by the other WTO members (UNECA 2007). 
Six regional EPA groups formed. All African groups showed a high 
heterogeneity, including “at least one ‘large’ non-LDC member with 
(economically) small LDC members” (Morrissey & Zgovu 2008, p. 4), which 
leads to the problem that most benefits accrue to the largest and biggest 
member (ibid.). In the SADC this is the ‘large’ South Africa (which already 
had a trade agreement with the EU) with LDCs such as Swaziland, 
Mozambique and (at the beginning of the negotiations) Angola.  
Apart from the pressure from the WTO, the African ACP countries had 
enough incentive to enter into the negotiations: As both the EU and the USA 
are involved in several negotiations with different less developed countries, 
Africa had to fear being isolated from bilateral trade agreements (UNECA 
2007). Richer countries with more negotiating capacity could, as the UNECA 
puts it, place themselves in the centre of a network of trade agreements, 
                                                        
37
 Within the text, a period (.) is used as a decimal mark. In the Appendix, due to the links to 
Excel, this could not be done and a comma (,) is used in the table and figures. Also, the ordinates 
in many diagrams show monetary values, which are not straightforward interpretable as US-
Dollars, Euros, or something else. The GTAP Data Base is denominated in millions of base year 
US dollars. Under standard closures in GTAP, one price variable is held fixed, and other prices 
are evaluated relative to this numéraire (Corong et al. 2017). By default the numeraire is “a global 
price index of factor remuneration, PFACTWLD, which is aggregated over all endowments, 
activities and regions, i.e., it represents the average global return to endowments” (ibid., p. 50). 
The absolute values are however unimportant, as the figures are only supposed to illustrate 
relative sizes and shares. 
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thereby attracting more investments (ibid.). To avoid this, African countries 
had to improve their negotiation capabilities (ibid.). McDonald and Walmsley 
(2003) also argue that Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland were at 
least partly compelled to follow South Africa’s trade policies because of the 
custom union all these countries share (the Southern African Custom Union, 
SACU). This is because of the common external tariff a custom union like the 
SACU imposes: When South Africa concluded the Free Trade Agreement with 
the EU (the ATDC) the other countries in the custom union were forced to 
reduce their tariffs on imports from the EU at the low rate agreed by South 
Africa in the ATDC (Grant 2006). While they lose their tariff revenue, they did 
by the same token not have South Africa’s preferential access to the EU market 
(ibid.). Signing an EPA is a possibility for them to get themselves out of this 
‘lose-lose’ situation. 
 
Despite all incentives and pressures to conclude a trade agreement, several 
deadlines for progress in negotiations on modalities (set in the Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO in 2005) were all missed during the first half of 2006 
(UNECA 2007). The negotiating partners found themselves in a deadlock, 
mainly associated with the demand and offers around agriculture (ibid.). By the 
end of 2007, when the negotiations between the ACP countries and the EU 
were scheduled to be concluded (Fontagné, Laborde & Mitaritonna 2011), only 
the Caribbean EPA had been finished as a comprehensive agreement (Ramdoo 
2014). More than half of the ACP countries had no agreement; the others had 
interim agreements with a narrow scope, covering only trade in goods and 
development cooperation (ibid.). Several of them were entered at the very last 
minute, out of the fear to lose the EU preferences (Meyn 2008). Even then, 
several African partners did not sign or implement the concluded deals – in 
CEMAC, ECOWAS and the Pacific EPA, less than a fifth of the original 
members initialled an EPA (ibid.). Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Mozambique signed their interim EPA in 2009 (Ramdoo 2014), which was (as 
most other EPAs at that time) not a joint liberalization offer, but in fact a 
bilateral trade deal with country-specific liberalization schedules (Meyn 
2008)
38
. South Africa, Angola and Namibia refused to sign. For some time, the 
EU continued to grant them the same privileges in terms of trade access, but in 
2010 the EU regarded this as untenable and increased the pressure by 
threatening to deny these privileges to non-signatories (CTA 2010). 
 
                                                        
38
 This is still the case for the final EPA, where Mozambique and South Africa have deviating 
tariffs 
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Meyn (2008) sees the high pressure under which the EPAs were concluded 
as a sign of the asymmetry in power and expertise, and questions how much 
the EPAs could have been properly negotiated under these circumstances. The 
EU justified its urging with the pressure from the WTO: Peter Mandelson 
emphasized at the International Trade Committee of the European Parliament 
that the EPA negotiations were rather negotiations with non-ACP developing 
countries and the WTO to find an agreement for the ACP countries that will 
“survive scrutiny in the WTO” (Mandelson 2007, p. 1). Indeed, there has been 
pressure by Latin American banana exporters and the USA, who in the 1990s 
filed WTO complaints against the EU treatment of ACP countries (Meyn 
2008). However, if the WTO requirements were the main issue, one would 
expect the EPA mainly to fulfil WTO requirements. Yet the EPAs were not 
aimed at just being a WTO-compatible goods arrangement, but should cover 
issues such as “services and investment and trade-related areas such as trade 
facilitation, intellectual property and cooperation on competition policy” 
(Mandelson 2007, p. 1). Several of the topics that are not required by the WTO 
raised the concerns of the ACP countries, as they could rather be negotiated on 
a case-by-case basis (Meyn 2008). The GATS-compatible service offer and the 
European Community requirement for ‘standstill’ and ‘most favoured nation’ 
clauses were not accepted by most EPA regions, including the SADC EPA 
group
39
 (ibid.). So why did the EU expedite issues that were neither required 
by the WTO, nor appreciated by the ACP countries?  
Meyn (2008) answers this by mentioning the ‘Global Europe: Competing in 
the world’ trade strategy, which intrinsically aimed at FTA with regions that 
are more interesting for European companies, but influenced the Commissions 
expectations to negotiate agreements that go beyond the WTO requirements. 
Heron and Siles-Brügge (2012) deepen this argument and compare aspects of 
the EPAs to commercially oriented bilateral agreements
40
. Opposed to that, the 
EU denies that this agreement was aimed at seeking market access for the EU, 
                                                        
39
 The GATS is the General Agreement on Trade in Services. The ‘standstill’ clause freezes 
the existing applied tariff in mutual trade. With the ‘most favoured nation’ clause any new tariff 
commitments granted to ‘major trading economies’ have to automatically also be given to any 
partner of the EPA (Meyn 2008).  
40
 Heron and Siles-Brügge (2012) see commercial drivers behind the liberalization 
commitments that go beyond the WTO requirements. However, most of their analysis seems to 
refer to the CARIFORUM EPA. When this EPA – which includes major parts on investment and 
services (Title II) and other trade related issues (Title IV), with detailed rules on intellectual 
property rights – is compared to the SADC EPA, it is apparent that the SADC EPA group’s 
commitments have a much more moderate extent and mentions these topics mostly to broach 
possible future negotiations. 
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and sees binding rules on services and related issues as necessary to maximize 
the development potential (Mandelson 2007). 
 
The pressure was increased by the narrative that the WTO would not allow 
for any alternative to the EPAs that would be less threatening for the ACP 
countries. Non-LCDs countries (i.e. countries that are not acknowledged as 
‘least developed countries’ by the United Nations) that would be unwilling or 
unable to complete an EPA would lose their preferences and merely have 
access to the GSP (Mandelson 22.10.2007). This was a serious menace: Mayn 
summarizes her previous studies stating that “In Botswana and Namibia the 
taxes imposed on beef exports would be equivalent to tariffs of up to 132%, 
exceeding those paid by some of the most competitive suppliers in the world, 
and most likely end African beef exports to the EU immediately” (2008, p. 
523). Consequently, as Bouët, Lamborde and Mervel summarize it, the debate 
was soon reduced “to the proverb: Of two evils, EPA or GSP, one must choose 
the lesser” (2007, p. 3). Indeed, this dichotomy do not reflect the whole 
picture.  
If the Southern African states would not have signed the EPA, the Cotonou-
Agreement would still have ended, and they would have fallen into different 
alternatives 
 Least developed countries, such as Lesotho and Mozambique, would 
have fallen under the Everything But Arms Agreement (EBA) 
(UNCTAD 2015) 
 Other developing countries would have fallen into the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP), such as Botswana, Namibia and 
Swaziland
41
  
 If these countries would ratify and implement a list of international 
conventions on core labour and human rights principles, they could also 
have access to the GSP+ regime, which grants full tariff removal on 
essentially the same product categories as GSP (Meyn 2008; European 
Commission 24.02.2017) 
 If neither EBA nor GSP applies, a country can just rely on MFN tariffs. 
This is however not valid for the remaining South Africa, as they have 
the ATDC 
Beyond these existing tariff systems, another solution was discussed little: 
                                                        
41
 These three had previously been excluded from the GSP because of the interim EPA (IEPA) 
resp. the final EPA, but since they are neither LDC, nor are listed as high-income or upper-
middle-income countries by the World Bank (UNCTAD 2015), they would fall back into this 
status again 
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Bouët, Laborde and Mevel (2007) point out, that the Enabling clause would 
have allowed for the construction of new tariff systems, based on the 
development stage of the partners. The Enabling clause, as discussions inside 
the WTO concluded
42
, allow for tariff differentiation towards certain similarly-
situated groups within the GSP beneficiaries. Bouët, Laborde and Mevel 
(2007) argue that the group of ‘small vulnerable economies’, as acknowledged 
by the WTO, meets this criterion
43
. This would have given the EU the 
possibility to create a different, non-reciprocal tariff schedule for several ACP 
countries, which would have included inter alia Namibia, Botswana and 
Swaziland. Considering that Lesotho and Mozambique are covered by the EBA 
and South Africa is covered by the ATDC, the EU could have found an 
alternative for all current SADC EPA countries that would probably have 
resulted in less strong tariff elimination for goods from the EU without 
violating the WTO regulations.
44
 
 
Finally, even within the framework of the EPA negotiations, the required 
degree of tariff elimination is up to interpretation. Article XXIV of the GATT 
1994 requires custom unions to eliminate duties and other restrictive 
regulations of commerce for “substantially all trade”. Although there is no 
clear and agreed definition of what that means, the EU “has set a benchmark of 
a minimum of 80% liberalisation over a period of generally 15 years, for tariff 
liberalisation in all EPAs” (Bilal & Ramdoo 2010, p. 14). This was, especially 
                                                        
42
 The Enabeling clause allows countries to provide differential and more favourable treatment 
to developing countries, which does not have to be granted to other WTO members. In the WTO 
document WT/DS246/AB/R the terms ‘non-discriminatory’ and ‘similarly-situated’ are discussed 
in detail. The European Community advanced the opinion that non-discriminatory treatment 
allows for the possibility to treat objectively different situations different (paragraph 149). 
Developing countries could be granted unequal competitive conditions in response to their special 
needs, e.g. in the form of tariff differentiation, if that is seen as an adequate response. India had a 
stricter view on this, not allowing for any different treatment of GSP beneficiaries. The WTO 
comments this by explaining in paragraph 156 that a non-discriminatory does not require identical 
tariff preferences for all developing countries and concludes in paragraph 173 that ‘non-
discriminatory’ tariff differences have to be available to all similarly-situated GSP countries, 
which is in consensus to the statements of the European Community (Paragraph 153). 
43
 The WTO states that the term ‘Small, vulnerable economies’ “applies to Members with 
economies that, in the period 1999 to 2004, had an average share of (a) world merchandise trade 
of no more than 0.16 per cent or less, and (b) world trade in non-agricultural products of no more 
than 0.1 per cent and (c) world trade in agricultural products of no more than 0.4 per cent.” 
(TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4/ paragraph. 157). Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland are included in the list 
of such countries in a WTO document of 2011 (WT/COMTD/SE/W/22/Rev.6 Annex I). 
44
 Such a solution would also have to be aligned with a common external tariff for the whole 
SACU group. Both the ATDC and the Interim EPA were however concluded without much 
regard for this.  
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for LCD, a point of concern, as they felt that this coverage and time frame does 
not match with their level of development, their need for industrialization, their 
national sensitivities and their need for tariff revenues (ibid.). Even if this was 
a serious obstacle in the negotiations, the EU showed little flexibility – which, 
according to Bilal and Ramdoo (2010), cannot be so much explained by WTO 
requirements, then by a strategical assertiveness of the EU to not cause a 
precedence that could weaken their position in further trade negotiations with 
other countries.  
In the SADC EPA group this problem seems to have been solved by 
accommodations of both sides: The SACU group – including the LDC Lesotho 
– was willing to agree on an 86% liberalization in the interim EPA and the 
final EPA (Bilal, Ramdoo 2010, European Commission 2016). Mozambique, 
the other LDC in the group, was granted a deal that only liberalizes 81% of the 
trade in the interim EPA, which was even lowered to 74% in the final 
agreement (ibid., ibid.)
45
.  
The main issue in the negotiations of the SADC EPA was rather to align the 
market access offers of the diverse group – with South Africa on one side, 
which already has an agreement with the EU (ATDC) and the other members 
of the SADC EPA group on the other hand, which are less developed (Bilal & 
Ramdoo 2010). 
 
It is not completely clear why the EU seems to have shown little interest in 
alternatives or “softer” EPAs. The open letter by the responsible EU 
Commissioners (Mandelson & Michel 2007) straightens out that the EU sees 
the status quo – Africa’s dependency on trade preferences – as an option that 
failed to deliver development. Meyn (2008) vents a general decreasing interest 
of the EU to aim at the development of the ACP countries: Because of 
additional member states of the EU, who have no colonial ties and face huge 
development challenges themselves, the EU would focus on its new members, 
East European neighbours or – concerned about security and migration – on 
the Near East. 
 
With all these obstacles, it took ten years of negotiations, until on July 15
th
, 
2014 a comprehensive agreement EPA with the whole SADC EPA Group 
including South Africa was successfully concluded (European Commission 
2017). The agreement was signed by the EU and the SACU members on June 
10
th
, 2016, the European Parliament gave its consent on September 14
th
, 2016 
(European Commission 2017). The agreement enters into force 30 days 
                                                        
45
 Own calculations on how much the tariffs are really reduced are listed in Appendix 7.4 
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following the deposit of the last instrument of ratification, acceptance or 
approval, but is provisionally applied earlier (L250, Article 113): While the 
SACU members have applied the agreement provisionally as of October 10
th
, 
2016 and are currently addressing implementation issues, Mozambique ratified 
late on April 28
th
, 2017 and will – after submitting the ratification instrument to 
the European Commission – only start with provisionally applying the EPA 
(European Commission 2017). 
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7.2 Economic structure of the partner countries           
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Figure 2: GDP per capita for the SADC EPA members in 2014 (data from the World Economic Outlook database of April 2017, provided by the IMF). The 
ordinate shows current USD per person. 
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Figure 3: GDP expressed in PPP for 2014 for all signatories of the SADC EPA (data from the World Economic Outlook database of April 2017, provided by the 
IMF). The ordinate shows the current international dollars in billions. 
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Figure 4:  The composition of the GDP by 
sector of origin (data from the World Fact Book, 
latest estimations, provided by the CIA). Not all 
columns sum up to 100% in the original data. 
The last three columns show an average for all 
Afrian SADC EPA members, where there shares 
are weighted with their GDP in PPP from the 
World Economic Outlook database.  
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Figure 5: GDP from the expenditure side. Note that the imports are subtracted from the other parts (source: GTAP database, GDPEXP) 
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Table 17. The intra-regional trade intensity index determines whether trade within the region is greater 
(index > 1) or smaller (index < 1) than should be expected on the basis of the region's importance in world 
trade (ARIC 2013). For this it divides the intra-regional trade share (Tii/Tiw) with the share in world trade 
(Tiw)/Tww) (ARIC 2013). Own calculation from GTAP output, VIWS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regional imports and exports (Tii) 5965,037203 
exports and imports of the region towards the world (Tiw) 266242,0128 
total world exports and imports (Tww) 20153934,91 
 
Intra-regional trade intensity index (Tii/Tiw)/(Tiw)/Tww) 1,695976508 
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Figure 6: Value added for skilled and unskilled labour, with colours indicating the sources of this value added (source: GTAP 
database, VFM) 
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Figure 8: Source of imports, measured in world prices (source: GTAP database, VIWS) 
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Figure 9. Destination of exports, measured in world prices, exports to the EU labelled with their percentage (source: GTAP database, VXWD) 
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Figure 10: Composition of the exports from the EU. (data from the GTAP database, variable VIMS) 
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Figure 12: Composition of the imports from the EU. (data from the GTAP database, variable VIMS) 
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7.3 Aggregation scheme 
Commonly not more than ten sectors are used. Since agricultural products 
should not be too aggregated (Crops&Grains stay separated from 
Meat&Livestock) and sensitive products like fish should be regarded 
individually, other sectors have to be aggregated. As explained in chapter 2, 
this is done to the service sector, as it is not directly affected by tariff changes. 
There are two sectors that are connected to service, one aggregating transport, 
communication, ut
obvious disadvantage is that construction does not fit into this 
group, as it belongs to the secondary sector rather than the tertiary. However, 
since there is not much use in giving construction an individual sector and 
since transport, communication, utilities and construction together give some 
conception about the investments in infrastructure, this separation is chosen to 
be the most meaningful. 
 
GrainsCrops (Grains and Crops) 
 Paddy rice (pdr) 
 Wheat (wht) 
 Cereal grains nec (gro) 
 Vegetables, fruit, nuts (v_f) 
 Oil seeds (osd) 
 Sugar cane, sugar beet (c_b) 
 Plant-based fibers  (pfb) 
 Crops nec (ocr) 
 Processed rice (pcr) 
MeatLstk (Livestock and Meat Products) 
 Cattle, sheep, goats, horses (ctl) 
 Animal products nec (oap) 
 Raw milk  (rmk) 
 Wool, silk-worm cocoons (wol) 
 Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse (cmt) 
 Meat products nec (omt) 
ProcFood (Processed Food) 
 Vegetable oils and fats (vol) 
 Dairy products (mil) 
 Sugar (sgr) 
 Food products nec (ofd) 
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 Beverages and tobacco products (b_t) 
Fish (Fish) 
 Fishing (fsh) 
Extraction (Mining and Extraction) 
 Forestry (frs) 
 Fishing (fsh) 
 Coal (coa) 
 Oil (oil) 
 Gas (gas) 
 Minerals nec (omn) 
TextWapp (Textiles and Clothing) 
 Textiles (tex) 
 Wearing apparel (wap) 
LightMnfc (Light Manufacturing) 
 Leather products (lea) 
 Wood products (lum) 
 Paper products, publishing (ppp) 
 Metal products (fmp) 
 Motor vehicles and parts (mvh) 
 Transport equipment nec (otn) 
 Manufactures nec (omf) 
HeavyMnfc (Heavy Manufacturing) 
 Petroleum, coal products (p_c) 
 Chemical,rubber,plastic prods (crp) 
 Mineral products nec (nmm) 
 Ferrous metals (i_s) 
 Metals nec (nfm) 
 Electronic equipment (ele) 
 Machinery and equipment nec (ome) 
TrnsCmUtiCns (Transport, Communication, Utilities and Construction) 
 Trade (trd) 
 Transport nec (otp) 
 Sea transport (wtp) 
 Air transport (atp) 
 Communication (cmn) 
 Electricity (ely) 
 Gas manufacture, distribution (gdt) 
 Water (wtr) 
 Construction (cns) 
OthServices (Other Services) 
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 Financial services nec (ofi) 
 Insurance (isr) 
 Business services nec (obs) 
 Recreation and other services (ros) 
 PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat (osg) 
 Dwellings (dwe) 
 
In the regional aggregation, the European Union is aggregated to one region, 
while the African SADC EPA countries are disaggregated as much as possible. 
This is possible for South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana and Namibia; 
however, Lesotho and Swaziland are aggregated in the GTAP database and 
hence need to remain aggregated. To be able to see changes in the trade 
relations with their neighbouring countries, the other SADC countries make 
another region, just as well as the Rest of Africa.  
 
EU_28 (European Union 28)     
    Austria (aut) 
    Belgium (bel) 
    Cyprus (cyp) 
    Czech Republic (cze) 
    Denmark (dnk) 
    Estonia (est) 
    Finland (fin) 
    France (fra) 
    Germany (deu) 
    Greece (grc) 
    Hungary (hun) 
    Ireland (irl) 
    Italy (ita) 
    Latvia (lva) 
    Lithuania (ltu) 
    Luxembourg (lux) 
    Malta (mlt) 
    Netherlands (nld) 
    Poland (pol) 
    Portugal (prt) 
    Slovakia (svk) 
    Slovenia (svn) 
    Spain (esp) 
    Sweden (swe) 
 82 
 
    United Kingdom (gbr) 
    Bulgaria (bgr) 
    Croatia (hrv) 
    Romania (rou) 
EPA_MOZ  Mozambique    
    Mozambique (moz) 
EPA_SA  South Africa    
    South Africa (zaf) 
EPA_NAM  Namibia    
    Namibia (nam) 
EPA_BWA  Botswana    
    Botswana (bwa) 
EPA_LS  Lesotho, Swaziland    
    Rest of South African Customs  (xsc) 
OthSADC  other SADC (w/o Seychelles)    
    South Central Africa (xac) 
    Madagascar (mdg) 
    Malawi (mwi) 
    Mauritius (mus) 
    Tanzania (tza) 
    Zambia (zmb) 
    Zimbabwe (zwe) 
RoAfri  Rest of Africa    
    Egypt (egy) 
    Morocco (mar) 
    Tunisia (tun) 
    Rest of North Africa (xnf) 
    Benin (ben) 
    Burkina Faso (bfa) 
    Cameroon (cmr) 
    Cote d'Ivoire (civ) 
    Ghana (gha) 
    Guinea (gin) 
    Nigeria (nga) 
    Senegal (sen) 
    Togo (tgo) 
    Rest of Western Africa (xwf) 
    Central Africa (xcf) 
    Ethiopia (eth) 
    Kenya (ken) 
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    Rwanda (rwa) 
    Uganda (uga) 
    Rest of Eastern Africa (xec) 
RestofWorld  Rest of World    
    All other countries 
 
In the factor aggregation, it is tried to split agricultural workers from other 
unskilled workers to later give independent results (e.g. about their nominal 
and real wage changes). The disaggregated GTAP database contains several 
forms of unskilled 
Agricultural and Unski
 was disaggregated from the other two forms of unskilled 
labour, hoping that it would really reflect mainly farmers. After taking this 
aggregation into GTAP and extracting some data, it was however noted that the 
 labour indeed contained much more than just 
farmers (Figure 13). Hence, the factor labour is only split in two subgroups: 
skilled labour and unskilled labour. 
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Note: It might seem more intuitive to the reader if there would be a graph showing the 
composition rather in numbers of workers or in hours worked rather than in value flows. 
However, the GTAP model, due to being based on value calculations, does not need or have 
explicit data for quantities or prices (Corong et al. 2017), so that such a diagram can 
unfortunately not be generated out of the GTAP database  
 
7.4 Calculating the tariffs 
The over 2000 pages of agreement text (most of it consisting of the 
appendix that specifies the tariffs for each commodity) are far from just being a 
list of new ad valorem tariffs. The agreement gives tariffs in different forms, 
among them specific tariffs (i.e. a certain amount of money have to be paid per 
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volume unit, like kilogram, independently of the current price), ad valorem 
tariffs (a percentage of the value of imports has to be paid, which connects the 
tariff not only to the import amounts, but also to the import prices47), mixed 
tariffs (a combination of specific and ad valorem tariffs), percentage reductions 
on the current MFN tariff, percentage point reductions on the current MFN 
tariffs and tariff rate quotas (TRQ are further explained in Appendix 7.5). 
TASTE  the programme used here to aggregate the tariffs for the GTAP 
sectors  can only calculate with ad valorem tariffs, so all other tariffs need to 
be recalculated. 
Many of the tariffs and quotas change over the years, to expand the 
liberalization over a larger time horizon. For this simulation, it all tariffs are set 
to the calculated level they will have ten years after the start of the agreement. 
 
To recalculate mixed tariffs, the current48 prices need to be taken out of 
MAcMAp  which works simply because the new mixed or specific tariffs 
usually replace old mixed or specific tariffs. For example, the good with the 
HS code 071040 (sweetcorn) has a mixed tariff when exported from South 
Africa into the EU. On MAcMAp it can be seen that when this good is 
imported into France49, a tariff of 5.1% + 9.4 EUR/100 kg/net eda has to be 
paid50. The ad valorem equivalent tariff according to MAcMAp is 14.99%.  
g) = 9.89%, then 
/9.4. This is the price per 100 kg. 
In the agreement, the new mixed tariff is 1.6 % + 9.4 EUR/ 100 kg/net eda. 
If we replace the price per 100 kg with our newly found price, we get 1.6 % + 
9.4 * 0.0989/9.4 = 0.092 = 11.49%. This is the ad valorem equivalent tariff. 
In a similar fashion, we can calculate all ad valorem equivalent tariffs for 
mixed tariffs and for specific tariffs (specific tariffs have simply 0% in the first 
part). 
 
Goods with more than 8 digits are handled differently. Often the 6-digit-
level above it only consists of 8-digit-commodities with the same rule; or at 
least has a strong majority of 8-digit-commodities with one rule, while the 
                                                        
47 Ad valorem tariffs are measured in percentage of the cif value of imports (Burfisher 2011) 
48 For current prices, 2014 has shown to be a good year, as both MAcMAp and (if needed) 
COMTRADE have most data reported for that year. In exceptions of missing data, data from 
earlier or later years is used. 
49 France is just picked is an example with well reported data  due to the ATDC other 
European countries have the same tariffs 
50 This is the tariff for 0710400000 
http://www.macmap.org/QuickSearch/FindTariff/FindTariffResults.aspx?product=071040&count
ry=251&partner=710&year=2014&source=1|ITC&AVE=1 
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others could be treated as exceptions. But sometimes there is no clear majority. 
Depending on the commodity and the kind of tariffs, often the simple average 
is taken (which sometimes required to recalculate the TRQ or mixed tariffs in 
there), sometimes the rule of a commodity without absolute majority is taken 
(especially when all the surrounding goods had the same rule) and sometimes, 
if a commodity seems to be highly protected by several different rules, simply 
the old tariff rate is kept.  
 
If no new tariff rules are specified, each product should have the Most-
Favored-N
force, possibly adapted to later changes if that is favourable to the nation facing 
the new tariff (L250, Article 23). Some products (like certain fish) only get a 
reduced tariff, decreasing over time till they are eliminated, other products (like 
certain dairy products and certain flowers) get a tariff rate quota that is 
extended over time. In Annex II the SACU explains new tariffs towards the 
EU, where again certain commodities  usually from the agricultural or food 
sector  are protected with tariff rate quotas or persisting tariffs. In Annex III 
Mozambique declares its changes towards the EU in a similar fashion. 
 
Despite all efforts, the tariff changes from TASTE, when taken over into 
GTAP, do not have a perfect precision. For some strongly liberalized trade 
flows, the import taxes (rTMS) turn negative, as the shock of the tariff was 
bigger than the initial tariff in the GTAP data base. This would mean that 
instead of just abolishing a tariff, the countries would subsidise imports  
which is not the intention of the EPA. For the affected trade flows, the tariff 
shock that TASTE calculated is commented out and a new tariff is calculated 
with GTAP, now not changing the %change power of the tms, but rather 
setting the target rate to zero. As a result, those tariffs now have a completely 
abolished (or at least very close to zero, because of rounding differences) tariff. 
 
When the average tariff changes for a GTAP sector are calculated out of the 
tariff changes for the HS sectors, some form of weighting needs to take place 
between the different goods. The weighting itself plays a crucial role for the 
final tariffs. A simple average has a poor level of relevance, as it does not 
reflect that a str
sparsely imported one (Fontagné, Laborde & Mitaritonna 2011). But if the 
tariffs are weighted with their trade value, a good that currently has a 
prohibitive tariff and thereby a traded amount of zero would not be reflected at 
all in the average  biasing the current protection level downwards (ibid.). To 
address this bias of trade-
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such as volatility between years, or inconsistencies between reporting by 
only give the possibility to weight the tariffs with their trade weights, but 
Th re used. 
giving rise to potential problems of aggregation bias: tariff shocks might be 
ibid., p. 9). To combat 
this problem, TASTE also gives the option of scaling the chosen set of weights 
so that they sum to the GTAP database trade matrix VIWS  of which this 
simulation also makes use. 
 
These are the tariff changes between the SADC EPA members:51  
  importer 
ex
po
rt
er
 
tariff 
change 
EU_28 MOZ SA NAM BWA LS 
EU_28 0% -68% -22% -67% -54% -23% 
MOZ 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -5% 
SA -57% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
NAM -90% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
BWA 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
LS -87% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Table 18: tariff changes as calculated (aggregated for all commodities) 
Surprisingly, even though Mozambique has abolished all tariffs towards EU 
imports (not all at the beginning of the implementation, but all until 10 years 
after the beginning of the implementation, which is what the simulation looks 
at), their tariff reduction is only 68%, not 100%. This was first seen as an 
inaccuracy of the calculation of TASTE, so instead of applying the TASTE 
%change power shocks, again all tariffs for imports from the EU to 
Mozambique were set to target rates of zero. But this could not solve the error: 
The reduction was now even only 65%. It seems likely that this is a calculation 
error that is hard to fix: the initial tariff for EU imports to Mozambique is 
                                                        
51 These tariffs are not the %changes shown for tms in the results, neither are they the 
difference between rTMS from the base data and the updated data, as neither offers a weighted 
aggregate between the countries. To get a weighted aggregate, the VIMS and VIWS from base 
data and updated data are regarded (keeping importers and exporters disaggregated, but products 
aggregated). Since VIMS = VIWS*(1+t) (where t stands for the tariff), (VIMS-VIWS)/VIWS is a 
straightforward way to get the average tariffs between two countries in a weighted aggregation for 
all sectors. 
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already only at 5% (Table 19), and the final tariff does not seem to sink below 
1.6% (TASTE shocks) resp. 1.8% (manual shocks for Mozambique with target 
rate). From here on, the TASTE calculation without manual shocks for 
Mozambique is used again, as they 
the tariffs from the BLMNS countries to the EU were completely abolished 
except for ammunition, but according to the calculation only 88% are 
abolished. But even more than in the case of Mozambique, this does not really 
affect the resulting tariffs: The initial tariffs were around 0.0002%, so whether 
a tariff close to zero is abolished by 100% or only 88%, does not really change 
the outcomes (Table 19). 
The EU commission published by how much the tariffs would decrease by 
trade volume (trade volume here probably referring to a trade weighted 
average, just as in the calculation) (European Commission 2016). Interestingly, 
the official tariff cuts are stronger (except for those towards Mozambique) than 
in the TASTE aggregation (Table 19). While the simulated time frame is 10 
years after the start of the agreement, the document by the EU commission 
leave open whether they calculate the tariff changes for the begin of the tariff 
schedule or for its end. The latter would cause some additional difference in 
the numbers, as the EU abolished its tariffs towards the SACU abruptly, while 
the SACU and Mozambique are granted a longer time frame.  
  
tariff 
before 
calculated 
tariff 
reduction 
resulting 
tariff 
anounced 
tariff 
reduction 
resulting 
tariff 
BLMNS to EU 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 100,0% 0,0% 
SA to EU 0,4% 63,2% 0,2% 98,7% 0,0% 
EU to SACU 2,1% 11,8% 1,8% 86,2% 0,3% 
EU to Moz 5,7% 100,0% 0,0% 74,0% 1,5% 
Table 19: tariff changes as calculated (with their resulting tariffs) and as announced by 
the EU commission (with their resulting tariffs).Own calculation was done with TASTE and 
trade weights  reference group weights show a lower reduction of tariffs towards the EU 
and a stronger reduction of tariffs towards the SACU. 
7.5 Turning TRQ into tariffs 
 
The SADC EPA classifies several commodities in categories that give 
detailed tariff rate quotas. Before these tariff rate quotas can be included in the 
TASTE aggregation, they need to be recalculated into ad valorem equivalents. 
No standardized process exists for this problem. A common way to get an ad 
valorem equivalent in the case of tariff rate quotas is to calculate a marginal 
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OQTR depends on the quota fill rate. If the quantity imported is smaller than 
80% of the quota volume, the AVE is calculated based upon the IQTR. Once 
the import quantity exceeds 98% of the quota volume, the AVE is calculated 
based upon the OQTR. Finally, if bilateral imports in the preceding year fall 
between 80 and 98% of the quota volume, the AVE of the tariff rate quota is 
1999-2016). This is a reasonable ex post method  however, when a new tariff 
rate quota is introduced, the resulting import quantities are not known. 
To be able to approximate the ad valorem tariff, an optimization problem 
was made up, based on three simple conditions. 
 
First, a formula for the ad valorem tariff equivalent is needed. If the 
assumed new import amount is under the quota, there is no problem, as simply 
the IQTR can be used. If the assumed new import amount exceeds the quota, 
the ad valorem tariff equivalent is calculated as follows: 
 
 
 
 
This formula depicts a tariff that  if applied to all estimated new imports  
gives identical tariff revenues, and should hence give the same welfare effects.  
 
Since consumers can be expected to react to tariff changes  respectively 
the resulting import price changes  this change in import demand is used to 
estimate the new amount. The GTAP database lists import elasticities for all 
their sectors, export countries and import countries, which is used here.  
 
 
 
ad valorem tariff equivalent from the first equation). 
 
 
 
Or simpler: 
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This price change approximation is a very isolated approach that would fit 
rather into a partial equilibrium model  
price that could emerge from a different resource allocation is not taken into 
account. Additionally, the world market prices are not assumed to change 
though the change in demand. More importantly, an import demand elasticity 
is used that was not intended for individual trade lines, but for much larger 
GTAP sectors. In order to have an approach that only needs limited amounts of 
data, this drawback is however accepted. 
 
There are three equations and two unknown variables (the ad valorem 
equivalent and the estimated new amount) and the price change as an auxiliary 
variable. Thereby, the Solver in Excel can find a unique solution in a 
convenient way (as an arbitrary goal function, the assumed imports are 
maximized). 52  This ad valorem tariff equivalent can then be put into TASTE. 
 
7.6 Changing the closures for the variations 
To create unemployment, the following commands are added to the closure 
rules: 
swap qo("UnSkLab","EPA_SA") = ps("UnSkLab","EPA_SA"); 
swap qo("UnSkLab","EPA_BWA") = ps("UnSkLab","EPA_BWA"); 
swap qo("UnSkLab","EPA_LS") = ps("UnSkLab","EPA_LS"); 
swap qo("UnSkLab","EPA_MOZ") = ps("UnSkLab","EPA_MOZ"); 
swap qo("UnSkLab","EPA_NAM") = ps("UnSkLab","EPA_NAM"); 
swap qo("SkLab","EPA_SA") = ps("SkLab","EPA_SA"); 
swap qo("SkLab","EPA_BWA") = ps("SkLab","EPA_BWA"); 
swap qo("SkLab","EPA_LS") = ps("SkLab","EPA_LS"); 
                                                        
52 In practice, the calculation becomes unsatisfactory in the moment data is needed  which is 
found in either too short old amount  a three year average of the 
years 2013, 2014 and 2015 is used, but since these years do not always have reported data in 
COMTRADE, different years have to be used in some cases. The old tariff  taken from 
MAcMAp, but several goods have very different tariffs for commodities that are specified up to a 
ten digit level, in which simply the first tariff in the list is used. If this tariff happened to be a tariff 
rate quota, the marginal tariff was used. And finally, the details in the trade agreement  which 
are listed far beyond the 6 digit level, with quotas often further specified according to e.g. 
container size or alcohol concentration  are strongly simplified to not go too far beyond the time 
constraints of this thesis. 
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swap qo("SkLab","EPA_MOZ") = ps("SkLab","EPA_MOZ"); 
swap qo("SkLab","EPA_NAM") = ps("SkLab","EPA_NAM"); 
To balance the government budget, the following commands are added to the 
closure rules: 
swap tp("EPA_SA") = del_ttaxr("EPA_SA"); 
swap tp("EPA_BWA") = del_ttaxr("EPA_BWA"); 
swap tp("EPA_LS") = del_ttaxr("EPA_LS"); 
swap tp("EPA_MOZ") = del_ttaxr("EPA_MOZ"); 
swap tp("EPA_NAM") = del_ttaxr("EPA_NAM"); 
 
7.7 Excursion: Why rules of origin matter 
 
What counts as an export from a country? If all goods that were shipped 
from an EPA partner would benefit from the favourable market access, there 
would be an incentive for trade deflection (i.e. goods from other countries 
would be exported e.g. via Mozambique to Europe, to face lower tariffs) 
(Naumann 2010). To ensure that only those commodities gain a preferential 
trade status that were processed in a country beyond merely superficial 
operations, the Rules of Origins are defined (ibid.). However, the precise 
definition of the Rules of Origin also restricts the production possibilities and 
choices of imported inputs and can thereby have a big effect on a countries 
production and export possibilities (ibid.) 53. The double-transformation 
requirements under the GSP would for example only accept fish as wholly 
obtained, if onerous requirements concerning the vessel, crew and location of 
the fishing activity  
commercial fishing fleet or concluded cooperation or joint-venture agreements 
with EU operators, they were unable to export to the EU under 
(ibid.). 
Naumann (2010) names several effects RoO can have, thus for restrictive 
RoO: 
 They are reducing the possibility to make use of cheap imported inputs 
in the own production, thereby causing higher costs in production and 
making a country less competitive than other exporters with more 
favourable RoO or local producers of the importing country 
                                                        
53 At least if the producer wants to make use of the preferential tariffs. Producers always have 
the possibility to export goods that do not align with the Rules or Origin at MFN tariffs 
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 If RoO give few commercially feasible options to exporters, they can 
function as a trade barrier54 
 As also consumers and retailers are affected by this price increase and 
reduction of choice, the restrictive RoO are likely to cause negative 
welfare effects 
 However, upstream producers (i.e. the suppliers of inputs) in the 
exporting country benefit from restrictive rules of origin, as the other 
producers must favour consuming they inputs under increasing 
restrictions for imported inputs  this can possibly foster the 
development of local industries just as well as regional integration55 
 
The SADC EPA includes the RoO over Article 22 and specifies them in 
Protocol 1. Since trade deflection is unlikely between states that face the same 
tariff from the import destination, the EPA allows for bilateral and diagonal 
cumulation, that states that all inputs that are from other SADC EPA countries 
(and even from EPA members of other ACP countries, as well as from the EU) 
are treated just like local inputs (L 250, Protocol I, Title II, Article 3, 4).56 This 
is only guaranteed for goods where EPA states indeed face the same trade 
status  imports from South Africa that still face a tariff may for example not 
be exported via another SADC EPA member that faces no tariffs. 
 
Since the GTAP model does not take rules of origin into account (Perez 
2006), many authors do not implement changes in their simulations. This is 
partly due to the little importance that many authors attach to them, partly due 
to the complexity of structures required for their analysis, especially in general 
                                                        
54 Especially in developing countries these effects of RoO are used for protectionist interests: 
drawback provisions; government procurement; countervailing duty and safeguard proceedings; 
and q
2000, p. 1). 
55 If restrictions are well designed, they can provide an incentive to develop upstream 
industries and economies of scale (Naumann 2010). Similarly, with favourable rules of origin that 
allow cumulation, the access to the EU markets could promote regional cooperation: An increased 
market could make local value chains of several partners worthwhile, impelling improvements in 
cross-border customs procedures, transport costs and coordinated hard and soft infrastructure and 
integrated industries, but only hopes for improvement though throttling trade, Naumann however 
sees this development model as not so successful. 
56 Several legal notions make sure that this cannot again be misused, by stating that the 
imported inputs must be further processed in the countries the cumulation allows for, or by adding 
for Southern African exports with a less favourable market access, that they may not be exported 
via another SADC EPA member.  
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equilibrium models (Falvey & Reed 2000). The studies that try to include RoO 
into their models found different approaches. Fox, Powers and Winston (2007) 
add an estimated compliance cost, which the RoO cause to the exporting 
producers. Similarly, Georges (2008) looks for the increase in the unit cost that 
the RoO cause to each sector of each country. While such approaches may be 
able to approximate the welfare effects of RoO, they cannot explain redirected 
trade flows that would be caused if a Southern African country may 
unrestrictedly import inputs from other ACP countries, but only in limited 
amounts of non-ACP countries. In a different take, Vanzetti and Huong (2014) 
make the reasonable assumption that a country cannot make use of the full 
tariff reductions in sectors where it is not self-sufficient, and reduce the tariff 
change by the degree of self-sufficiency57. This approach can also not explain 
trade shifts between the different input suppliers. Additionally, one could argue 
that RoO should ideally not be modelled over the same parameter as tariffs, as 
analysis (2000) demonstrates. While tariffs would focus on the 
elasticity of supply of value added, the rules of origin would influence the 
composition of intermediate inputs (ibid.). A possible way to take this into 
respect could be the adaptation of Armington elasticities. 
 
The RoO are a crucial factor in the trade for southern African states. This 
can be maybe seen in the fact that an LDC like Mozambique, which already 
has very favourable tariffs due to the EBA and has no pressure to align with the 
custom union of the SACU states, still had enough incentive to join the IEPA 
and later the EPA.58 
                                                        
57 This approach becomes more complicated when the country does not have to be self-
sufficient, but can rely on intermediate inputs from other ACP countries, as in the SADC EPA 
58 Apart from more liberal RoO compared to those under the EPA agreement, the EU also 
included topics in the negotiations such as the EU commodity protocol on bananas, rice and 
sugar, reduction in subsidies to agricultural production and export or a financial compensation for 
revenue losses (United Nations 2011). Why were the incentives then strong enough for 
-exports, 
which could increase their merchandise exports (between 2000 and 2005) stronger than other 
African countries and even stronger than the world on average (UNECA 2007). Possibly, 
being asked to sign up blind in the faith that the new rules will be more development friendly. 
However, indications from internal negotiations within the EU indicate a strong likelihood that 
well 2007) 
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7.8 General results 
 
GDPEXP consumption investment government expenditure net exports Total 
EU 60% 19% 22% -1% 100% 
Mozambique 69% 31% 11% -11% 100% 
South Africa 61% 19% 22% -2% 100% 
Namibia 49% 22% 17% 13% 100% 
Botswana 41% 27% 16% 16% 100% 
Lesotho& Swaziland 61% 10% 15% 15% 100% 
Table 20: Contributors to the GDP before the shock (GTAP database, GDPEXP) 
 
GDPEXP C I G X-I Total 
EU 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% 
Mozambique -0,4% 0,0% -0,4% 0,7% -0,4% 
South Africa 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,1% 0,0% 
Namibia 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% -0,2% 0,0% 
Botswana 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% -0,1% 0,0% 
Lesotho& 
Swaziland 0,0% 0,1% 0,0% -0,1% 0,0% 
 Table 21: The change of the GDP in the basic simulation, composed of consumption, 
investment, government expenditures and exports net of imports (own calculations from 
GTAP database, GDPEXP). Note that the EU; Mozambique and South Africa had a 
actually a widening of the trade deficit and coloured in red. Namibia, Botswana and 
Lesotho&Swaziland had a positive trade balance before the shock, so their negative 
changes are more intuitive. In VAR1a-c the results are almost identical, but in VAR2 all 
effects are strongly mitigated, which results in a 0% change in GDP for all regions (see also 
next table).  
 
Welfare basic simulation VAR1a VAR1b VAR1c VAR2 
EU 0,0013% 0,0013% 0,0011% 0,0011% 0,0013% 
Mozambique -0,1292% -0,1044% -0,1224% -0,1212% -0,1411% 
South Africa -0,0126% -0,0190% -0,0108% -0,0110% -0,0142% 
Namibia 0,0055% 0,0128% 0,0052% 0,0128% 0,0041% 
Botswana 0,0070% 0,0002% 0,0038% 0,0095% 0,0066% 
Lesotho&Swaziland 0,0067% -0,0018% 0,0072% 0,0044% 0,0060% 
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Table 22: The changes of the welfare compared for the different simulation variations, now 
expressed as percent of the GDP (own calculation  
from GTAP output, WELFARE, GDPEXP) 
 
WELFARE 1 alloc_A1 2 endw_B1 3 tech_C1 4 pop_D1 5 tot_E1 6 IS_F1 7 pref_G1 Total 
1 EU_28 88,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 141,0 5,3 0,0 234,4 
2 EPA_MOZ -2,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 -7,0 -6,6 0,0 -16,2 
3 EPA_SA -24,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 -22,0 -4,9 0,0 -51,0 
4 EPA_NAM 0,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,8 0,6 0,0 0,7 
5 EPA_BWA 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,4 1,3 0,0 1,1 
6 EPA_LS 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,5 0,6 0,0 0,4 
Table 23: The decomposition of the welfare change in the basic simulation (GTAP output, 
WELFARE). In the simulation variations the results are similar, but variations with 
unemployment also have endowment effects, which are (except for Namibia) negative. 
7.9 State revenue 
The state earns all its revenue out of taxes, which are the following 
  
1. Output/Production taxes 
 
2. Tax on the use of endowments 
 3. Tariffs fro
consumption 
 
purchases 
 
 consumption 
 
 purchases 
 
consumption 
 stic 
purchases 
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 9. Export taxes, used to e.g. ensure that 
adequate supplies of vital goods remain 
available for the home market 
(Burfisher 2011) 
 
10. Import taxes 
Table 24: sources of state revenue, formulas taken from Hertel (1997, p. 24) 
To simplify the analysis, all tariffs revenues (3, 5, 7) and all taxes from 
domestic purchases (4, 6, 8) are grouped in the following. 
 
We can see in   Table 25 that taxes for import consumption and taxes on 
imports only make up a limited share of the state revenues. In total numbers 
South Africa seems to lose the most state revenue of the African partners, but 
when regarded in percentages, it becomes clear that Mozambique and 
Botswana suffer the most from this shock to their state revenue. 
 
  EU Mozambique 
South 
Africa Namibia Botwana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland 
tariff revenues before 41306 315 5409 108 95 76 
tariff revenues after 41267 262 5235 104 91 74 
loss tariff revenues -0,09% -16,83% -3,21% -3,55% -4,84% -2,44% 
revenue before 5040245 1000 49227 795 137 406 
revenue after 5040507 943 49034 791 133 404 
renevue losses 0,01% -5,70% -0,39% -0,47% -3,37% -0,46% 
share of tariff revenues 
in total state revenues 
(before simulation) 0,8% 31,5% 11,0% 13,6% 69,3% 18,6% 
  Table 25: Tariff losses and revenue losses through the EPA in the basic simulation. 
Calculations based on the GTAP output (several headers). 
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Figure 14: State revenue changes through the EPA (basic simulation, own calculation from GTAP output, several headers) 
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Figure 15: Current accounts of the countries and their changes, as given by GTAP - this is simply the trade balance. 
7.10 Current account 
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Figure 16: Export and Import structure before and after the basic simulation (taken from the current account data from the GTAP simulation, i.e. with all 
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Figure 17: Exports and imports with the EU before and after the basic simulation (data from the GTAP simulation, VIWS) 
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  Mozambique South Africa Namibia Botswana 
Lesotho & 
Swaziland total 
1 GrainsCrops -1% 2% 0% 0% 0% 2% 
2 MeatLstk 272% 47% -1% 0% 25% -32% 
3 ProcFood -42% -104% -2% 126% -1% 73% 
4 Fish -1% 9% 0% 2% 1% 6% 
5 Extraction 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
6 TextWapp 556% 237% -161% 310% -679% 290% 
7 LightMnfc 94% 10% -52% -11% 42% 14% 
8 HeavyMnfc -21% 5% -42% 8% 101% 10% 
9 TrnsCmUtiCns -75% -1% 7% 2% -1% -1% 
10 OthServices -1% 1% 6% -11% -5% 4% 
total -38% 8% -9% -1% -5% 39% 
Table 26: Percentage change of the trade balance with the EU in the basic simulation (data is calculated out of the GTAP output for the variable 
VIWS). This change is slightly counterintuitive: Whether a country widens its trade deficit or its hange. 
Colours are used to clarify which sectors win and lose (green in the trade balance improves, red if it diminishes). 
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terms of trade 
effects/GDP basic simulation VAR1a VAR1b VAR1c VAR2 
EU 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Mozambique -0,06% -0,06% -0,05% -0,05% -0,06% 
South Africa -0,01% -0,01% 0,00% 0,00% -0,01% 
Namibia -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% 
Botswana 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 
Lesotho&Swaziland -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% 
Table 27: Same terms of trade effects as in the table before, but now set into relation to the countries GDP (data from the GTAP simulation) 
 
 
 
 
7.11 Regional trade 
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Figure 18. Changes in trade with the EU within the SADC EPA group in the basic simulation (data from GTAP database, VIWS) 
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Figure 19: e net of other groups, 
i.e. the green column shows how much less is imported from SADC countries that are not already depicted in the blue column of SADC EPA countries 
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  SADC EPA plus SADC plus RoA 
regional imports and exports 5965,04 22627,38 64488,07 
exports and imports of the region towards the world 266242,01 409909,55 1228823,09 
total world exports and imports 20153934,91 20153934,91 20153934,91 
      
Intra-regional trade intensity index 1,695977 2,714051 0,860717 
    
  SADC EPA plus SADC plus RoA 
regional imports and exports 5835,83 22492,85 64343,75 
exports and imports of the region towards the world 267291,64 410951,50 1229854,29 
total world exports and imports 20154565,54 20154565,54 20154565,54 
      
Intra-regional trade intensity index 1,646287 2,684335 0,857378 
  -2,9% -1,1% -0,4% 
Table 28: changes in the intra-regional trade intensity index before and after the basic simulation in different regional groups: The SADC EPA 
group, the whole SADC group including the SADC EPA group, and the whole of Africa including the former two. Underneath, the percentage changes 
of the index are given   
affected than the close regional groups (own calculation out of the GTAP output, VIWS) 
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regional trade 
index SADC EPA SADC Africa 
initially 1,696 2,714 0,861 
basic 
simulation 1,646 2,684 0,857 
VAR1a 1,646 2,684 0,857 
VAR1b 1,646 2,685 0,857 
VAR1c 1,646 2,685 0,857 
VAR2 1,646 2,684 0,857 
Table 29: changes in the intra-regional trade intensity index (same calculation as above) for all simulation variations. If the percentage change 
would be calculated here as well, it would always be -4,9%, -1,9% and -0,7% as in Table 28. 
 
  
Grains & 
Crops 
Meat & 
Livestock Food Proc. Fish Extraction Textiles 
Light 
Manu. 
Heavy 
Manu. 
TrnsCmUti
Cns 
Other 
services 
regional imports 
(SADC EPA) 0,2411 -0,9998 -0,9999 0,8700 -0,5690 0,1188 -0,1362 -0,0505 -0,9913 0,3638 
regional imports 
(otherSADC) -0,8206 -0,9976 -0,9996 0,9841 0,3735 -0,5987 -0,3626 -0,8440 0,9400 0,9750 
regional imports 
(RoA) -0,9984 -0,9069 -0,9881 0,9467 0,6014 -0,9587 -0,9834 -0,9794 0,9994 0,9981 
imports RoW -0,8729 -0,8813 -0,9928 0,9808 0,5024 -0,9998 -0,9942 -0,9988 0,9995 0,9931 
regional exports 
(SADC EPA) -0,9900 -0,9890 -0,9664 -0,8764 -0,5322 -0,9908 -0,9904 -0,9913 -0,1680 0,6764 
regional exports 
(otherSADC) -0,9716 -0,9895 -0,0115 -0,9859 0,6739 0,9961 0,9929 0,9952 -0,1000 0,9417 
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regional exports 
(RoA) -0,9917 -0,9886 0,7865 -0,9498 0,9707 0,9982 0,9920 0,9915 0,9548 0,9949 
exports RoW -0,9846 -0,9896 0,9622 -0,9914 0,9958 0,5136 0,9956 0,9943 0,9773 0,9980 
VA in the 
country 0,9888 -0,7307 -0,0658 0,9642 -0,5985 -0,9284 -0,9897 -0,9152 -0,1333 0,9693 
Table 30: correlation coefficient between the absolute change in EU imports and several imports, exports and the value added. The coefficient can 
take values between -1 (very negative correlation) and 1 (very positive correlation) (Basic simulation, own calculation from GTAP output, several 
variables) 
7.12 Agriculture and industry59 
    basic VAR1a VAR1b VAR1c VAR2 
South Africa Grains&Crops 1,95% 1,95% 1,88% 1,88% 0,75% 
  Meat&Livestock 0,16% 0,16% 0,11% 0,11% 0,03% 
  Food Processing -0,03% -0,03% -0,07% -0,07% 0,67% 
  Fish 1,88% 1,87% 1,95% 1,95% 2,77% 
Botswana Grains&Crops 0,04% 0,04% 0,17% 0,18% -0,09% 
  Meat&Livestock 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,01% -0,08% 
  Food Processing -0,01% -0,01% 0,00% 0,00% -0,26% 
                                                        
59 On the sectors: Both Fish and Food Processing do not belong to farming, yet they are closely connected to the food sector and have been included in other 
studies. Fishery is partly done by self-sustaining fishers that might face similar challenges as smallholders, while the processing of food is closely related through 
forward linkages). It can obviously be questioned whether TrnsCmUtiCns is not entirely an industrial sector, but since construction is technically part of it, it is 
listed here for completeness 
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  Fish 0,08% 0,06% 0,14% 0,15% -0,07% 
Mozambique Grains&Crops -0,11% -0,09% -0,09% -0,09% -0,39% 
  Meat&Livestock -1,51% -1,49% -1,86% -1,86% -1,70% 
  Food Processing -0,23% -0,20% -0,32% -0,32% -0,97% 
  Fish -0,57% -0,50% -0,72% -0,71% -2,12% 
Namibia Grains&Crops 0,00% 0,01% 0,03% 0,04% -0,05% 
  Meat&Livestock 0,10% 0,10% 0,06% 0,07% -0,32% 
  Food Processing 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% -0,12% 
  Fish -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,01% -0,34% 
Lesotho&Swaziland Grains&Crops 0,00% -0,01% 0,02% 0,01% -0,05% 
  Meat&Livestock 0,01% 0,00% 0,01% 0,01% -0,05% 
  Food Processing 0,00% 0,00% 0,01% 0,01% -0,09% 
  Fish 0,04% 0,03% 0,03% 0,03% -0,20% 
Table 31: changes in the value added for sectors connected to food production. The colours indicate the strength of the change. Sectors that lose more 
than 0,5% of their value added are additionally highlighted with red font colour (data from the GTAP output, VFM). 
 
    basic VAR1a VAR1b VAR1c VAR2 
South Africa Textiles -0,02% -0,03% -0,04% -0,04% -0,45% 
  Light Manufacturing -0,04% -0,05% -0,04% -0,04% -0,22% 
  Heavy Manufacturing -0,11% -0,12% -0,11% -0,11% -0,08% 
  TrnsCmUtiCns 0,01% 0,00% 0,03% 0,03% 0,02% 
Botswana Textiles 0,11% 0,09% 0,04% 0,05% 0,45% 
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  Light Manufacturing -0,12% -0,13% -0,12% -0,11% -0,21% 
  Heavy Manufacturing -0,19% -0,23% -0,09% -0,07% -0,07% 
  TrnsCmUtiCns 0,04% 0,03% 0,06% 0,07% 0,00% 
Mozambique Textiles -0,82% -0,79% -0,89% -0,89% -2,21% 
  Light Manufacturing -0,90% -0,87% -0,93% -0,93% -1,88% 
  Heavy Manufacturing 0,56% 0,60% 0,29% 0,30% 1,04% 
  TrnsCmUtiCns 0,30% 0,31% 0,32% 0,32% 0,23% 
Namibia Textiles -0,13% -0,13% -0,12% -0,11% -0,72% 
  Light Manufacturing -0,15% -0,15% -0,20% -0,20% -0,39% 
  Heavy Manufacturing 0,02% 0,03% 0,01% 0,01% 0,08% 
  TrnsCmUtiCns 0,02% 0,03% 0,03% 0,04% 0,06% 
Lesotho&Swaziland Textiles 0,04% 0,03% 0,00% -0,01% 0,10% 
  Light Manufacturing -0,40% -0,41% -0,46% -0,46% -1,11% 
  Heavy Manufacturing -0,13% -0,14% -0,14% -0,14% -0,06% 
  TrnsCmUtiCns -0,02% -0,03% 0,01% 0,01% -0,04% 
Table 32: changes in the value added for sectors connected to the industry. The colours indicate the strength of the change. Sectors that lose more than 
0,5% of their value added are additionally highlighted with red font colour (data from the GTAP output, VFM). 
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Figure 20: changes in wages and other factor incomes. Not that these changes apply to all sectors, as all factors are perfectly mobile (data from GTAP 
database, pm) 
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Figure 21. Real changes in wages and other factor incomes (i.e. 
all factors are perfectly mobile (data from GTAP database, pfactreal) 
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    Mozambique South Africa Namibia Botswana Lesotho&Swaziland 
VAR1a Skilled -0,17% 0,00% 0,01% -0,07% -0,08% 
  Unskilled -0,13% -0,02% 0,03% -0,05% -0,07% 
VAR1c Skilled -0,17% 0,00% 0,01% -0,07% -0,08% 
  Unskilled -0,13% -0,02% 0,03% -0,05% -0,07% 
 Table 33: employment changes in the two versions that allowed for unemployment (data from the GTAP output, qo) 
Botswana Lesotho&Swaziland Mozambique Namibia South Africa 
GrainsCrops 0,03% 0,00% -0,07% -0,01% 1,61% 
MeatLstk 0,00% 0,01% -1,43% 0,09% 0,05% 
ProcFood -0,01% 0,00% -0,20% 0,01% -0,03% 
Fish 0,02% 0,01% -0,18% 0,00% 0,66% 
Extraction 0,01% 0,01% 0,09% 0,01% 0,03% 
TextWapp 0,09% 0,03% -0,77% -0,12% -0,03% 
LightMnfc -0,13% -0,41% -0,86% -0,15% -0,05% 
HeavyMnfc -0,23% -0,15% 0,63% 0,03% -0,12% 
TrnsCmUtiCns 0,03% -0,03% 0,35% 0,03% 0,00% 
OthServices -0,01% 0,00% -0,06% 0,02% -0,03% 
Total -0,05% -0,07% -0,13% 0,03% -0,02% 
Table 34: employment changes for skilled and unskilled labour for VAR1a (data from the GTAP output, qfe) 
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Skilled Labour Botswana Lesotho&Swaziland Mozambique Namibia South Africa 
GrainsCrops 0,09% 0,01% -0,03% 0,02% 0,86% 
MeatLstk 0,01% 0,00% -0,92% 0,04% 0,02% 
ProcFood 0,01% 0,00% -0,14% 0,01% -0,04% 
Fish 0,04% 0,01% -0,19% 0,00% 0,51% 
Extraction 0,00% 0,00% 0,06% 0,01% 0,02% 
TextWapp 0,03% -0,01% -0,43% -0,04% -0,03% 
LightMnfc -0,05% -0,23% -0,45% -0,08% -0,03% 
HeavyMnfc -0,03% -0,08% 0,17% 0,02% -0,06% 
TrnsCmUtiCns 0,04% 0,00% 0,18% 0,04% 0,01% 
OthServices 0,01% 0,00% -0,06% 0,02% -0,01% 
Total -0,05% -0,07% -0,13% 0,03% -0,02% 
Table 35: employment changes for skilled and unskilled labour for VAR1c (data from the GTAP output, qfe) 
 
 
